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This thesis will examine, describe, and analyze the Marine
Corps service planning process to determine the extent that it
is strategic and effective. It will begin by reviewing the
various terminology associated with strategic management.
This will be followed by a synopsis of military structures and
processes, as well as the external and internal influences
which make up the ever changing backdrop for the Marine Corps
service planning process. Finally, the Marine Corps service
planning process, which encompasses the informal and formal
processes that steer the actions, thinking, and planning
efforts of the Marine Corps, will be described and analyzed to
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Although planning has always been a hallmark of the
military services, recent attention in the form of the Packard
Commission (1986) , the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the
reality of resource scarcity following the Graham-Rudman-
Hollings (GRH) Act of 1985, have identified planning
disconnections between national security goals and budgeted
force capabilities. Their resolution has become a top
priority. These external forces combined with current
leadership initiatives within the Marine Corps have led to
significant changes in the Marine Corps' service planning
process.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis will document the changes that have occurred
in the Marine Corps service planning process. Additionally,
this thesis will analyze the process to determine if the new
service planning process is strategic. Two major questions
inform this thesis:
What is the current service planning process in the
Marine Corps?




The methods employed in this thesis are qualitative in
nature. Data collection relied on interviews and archival
research. The methodology of this thesis proceeded as
follows:
- Archival research included a comprehensive review of
current military journals, USMC planning publications and
manuals, and written organizational procedures, policies
and correspondence.
Seven interviews with Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC)
personnel involved with service planning, which included
Secretary for the General Staff, Head of the Plans
Division and his assistants in the Strategic Initiatives
and Service Plans and Policy Branches, and the Director
of the Special Projects Directorate. Representatives
from Requirements and Programs Division and Manpower and
Reserve Affairs, and Installations and Logistics
Departments were also interviewed.
Ten interviews with Marine Corps Combat Development
Command (MCCDC) were conducted. Those interviewed
included representatives from the Concepts and Plans,
Studies and Analysis, Proponency and Requirements, and
Doctrine Branches of the Warfighting Center.
Representatives from the Wargaming and Assessment, and
Training and Education Centers, including the Director,
and Head of the Art of War Division of the Command and
Staff College, were interviewed.
Three interviews with Marine Corps Research Development
and Acquisition Command (MCRDAC) representatives, which
included the Head of the Resource Analysis Branch and the
Adjutant/ Administration officers.
D. DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY
The terms "strategic planning" and "strategic management"
are synonymous and can be used interchangeably. However, we
will make the argument that strategic management is a superior
term for the military environment.
strategic planning and strategic management are difficult
terms to comprehend, because of the nebulous nature of their
social science origin, and because of some natural, inherent
bias in our military training and thinking. The three words
—strategy, planning, and management, have a separate meaning
and/or connotation for military professionals than for those
outside the service, and the confounding of these very
familiar words can result in a grievous misunderstanding.
Therefore, we will discuss some of the terminology used in
this paper.
1. Strategy
For instance the term strategy, a generic term, means
something different to a military officer than to a corporate
manager. According to Karl Von Clausewitz, strategy "forms
the plan of war. .. (that links)... the employment of the battle
(engagements) as the means towards the attainment of the
objective of the War (ends)." (Clausewitz, 1968, p. 241)
While to a corporate executive, "strategy is a unified,
comprehensive and integrated plan designed to ensure that the
basic objectives of the enterprise are achieved." (Quinn,
Mintzberg and James, 1988, p. 14) The former definition we
will refer to as military strategy and the latter as corporate
or organizational strategy.
Henry Mintzberg encourages us to expand the definition
of strategy from one that considers it almost exclusively a
plan , a "consciously intended course of action." (Quinn, et
al., 1988, p. 14) According to Mintzberg, strategy can also
be: a ploy—a maneuver intended to outwit an opponent or
competitor; a pattern—consistency in behavior, whether or not
intended; a position—identifying where an organization
identifies itself... in its environment; or a perspective—not
just a position, but an ingrained way of perceiving the
world. (Quinn, et al., 1988) Organizational strategy can be
one of these five forms or any combination thereof. Strategy
can also emerge from the operating level of an organization
and therefore may not be exactly what was intended by the
decision makers.
Some of these alternate concepts of strategy are
discernible in the Marine Corps' service strategy statement,
the Marine Corps Campaign Plan (MCCP) . For example, in the
Commandant's opening statement, pattern, plan, position and
perspective are evident. "We are the Nation's most rapidly
deployable and employable expeditionary, combined arms force."
(MCCP, undated, p. 1) The incorporation of innovative, high
technology equipment, such as the Landing Craft Air Cushion
(LCAC) , Advanced Assault Amphibian (AAA) , CH-53E helicopter
and MV-22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft, represent a consistent
pattern of behavior that will allow "us to continue to project
power into the future." (MCCP, undated, p. 2) It should be
noted that the acquisition of this modern equipment is mostly
a plan to implement the "over the horizon" amphibious assault
concept. The Marine Corps has positioned itself "as a total
force... task organized as Marine Air-Ground Task Forces.
MAGTF ' s are the premier U.S. combined arms force-in-readiness
capable of sustained operations." (MCCP, undated, p. 1) This
positioning is with such conviction that it is perspective .
2 . Planning
According to David Conover, Director of Corporate
Planning at Western Electric, "The real planners are the
managers who make final decisions, and what we call planning
is the support service intended to help make those decisions
better." (Helmly, 1988, p. 9) As discussed previously,
strategic management is more than planning, but the essence of
military strategy is planning. Random House Dictionary
defines strategy as "the utilization, during both peace and
war of all the nations forces through large-scale, long-rancre
planning and development to ensure security or victory."
(Random House Dictionary, 1987, p. 1880) According to the USMC
Draft Planner's Reference Manual, military planning can be
separated into two types: force development planning and
operational planning.
Force development planning is that planning associated with
the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It
is largely the responsibility of the military departments,
although the JCS provide strategic advice and OSD provides
managerial coordination. Operational planning is directed
toward the employment of military forces within the context
of a military strategy. It is performed by the JCS and the
unified/specified commanders. (Draft Planners Reference
Manual, 1983, p. 3-1-3)
Force development planning should be the implementation of
strategic management decisions, as operational planning is the
implementation of military strategy.
a. Department of Defense (DoD) Planning
All services, including the Marine Corps,
participate in DoD level planning (joint and PPBS) and conduct
their own service planning. Joint planning, which derives the
National Military Strategy to support the National Strategy,
consists of participation in the Joint Strategic Planning
System (JSPS) and the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS)
.
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) is the
formalized method for force development planning. Ideally,
programming and budgeting should implement planning concepts
and decisions and not drive them. Service planning attempts
to integrate planning, programming and budgeting with the
National Military Strategy, so that the organization can best
contribute to the overall security needs of the nation. This
thesis will focus on the Marine Corps' service planning,
during General Gray's tenure as Commandant of the Marine Corps
(CMC) , to include analysis of recent changes made in the
process including the creation of two new commands: the
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and the Marine
Corps Research, Development and Acquisition Command (MCRDAC)
b. Service Planning
The service planning process should formulate the
service strategy and oversee its execution. Service planning
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must integrate and coordinate the service's input to the PPBS
to create and maintain an organization that can execute the
military strategy derived from the JSPS. In addition to
meeting the declared national goals, it must remain within
available resources. Therefore, service strategy must provide
direction in developing the most effective organization to
support higher echelon strategies at an affordable price. As
will be discussed in Chapter III, the preparation of combat
forces, in the Marine Corps, is accomplished by strategically
managing four critical areas: doctrine, structure/organ-
ization, education/training, material/equipment. A
combination of changes in some or all of the four critical
areas may be necessary to create a new, required combat force
capability. (Weeks, Pelli, 1987)
Traditionally, the start of the service planning
process, after evaluating a threat assessment and receiving
Service Chief guidance, has been the long-range plan. The
long-range plan, which addressed the period 10-20 years in the
future, was designed to guide the organization during this
period. However, long-range planning, after close scrutiny by
the Packard Commission and Congress, was criticized, along
with other types of planning, as being the silent P in PPBS.
Short range progrcunming and budgeting concerns had preempted
any thoughtful, long-term force developm.ent planning.
c. Long-Range Planning
Long-range planning is "rollback" planning, where
organizational goals are predicted for the future and then the
plans are worked in reverse to provide a path from the future
to today. This type of planning lacks flexibility and vision
because it "assumes that current trends will continue and
plans tend to be linear extrapolations of the present."
(Tritten, Roberts, 1989, p. 13) Although there have been
recent attempts to emphasize and improve long-range planning,
it is still not strategic management and may not be able to
solve all our force development planning problems. In
contrast to long-range planning, strategic management:
...analyzes an organization's external environment and
internal climate, and searches for trends, discontinuities,
surprises and competitive advantages.
..
(and considers a
wide) variety of possible alternatives to respond promptly
to unforeseen contingencies. (Tritten, Roberts, 1989, p. 2)
Let us make it clear that long-range planning is not strategic
management, but that long-range planning, as a component of
the service planning process, can have a vital strategic
impact, especially during strategy implementation. Formal,
systematic long-range planning in the Marine Corps is now done
at MCCDC using the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS)
and the trilogy of service plans: Marine Corps Campaign Plan




The Marine Corps' strategy process, service
planning, is the focus of this thesis and will be described
and analyzed within the context of strategic management.
3 . Management
Management is:
...the process of planning, organizing, leading and
controlling the efforts of organizational members and of
using all other organizational resources to achieve stated
organizational goals. (Stoner, Wankel, 1986, p. 4)
Despite this challenging and commendable definition,
management is a term that has a severe identity crisis within
the Marine Corps. Management is viewed as bureaucratic,
insensitive problem solving from behind a desk, by a combat
organization that values the example of leading from the
front. Despite its unfair bureaucratic label, management
encompasses both planning and leadership, and emphasizes
coordinating the organization's means towards its desired
ends . Management is a richer and more descriptive term than
planning and helps add to the meaning of strategic management.
Although strategic management and strategic planning
are academically equivalent, we feel that the former lends
itself to a more precise and less confusing definition for the
Marine Corps. Use of the term strategic management will
reduce confusion with the myriad of other planning systems and
avoid institutional myopia the word planning will cause.
Also, this will reinforce the concept that strategic
management is not long-range planning and is something grander
and more vital to an organization.
4 . Strategic Management
Strategic management is the means for integration and
coordination of the entire organization towards common,
achievable and effective goals (ends) . (Tritten, Roberts,
1989 and Hofer, Schendel 1978) This definition brings out
three points that need to be discussed. One, that strategic
management includes both strategy formulation and
implementation. Secondly, that strategy formulation (means)
includes goal formulation (ends) . And finally, the important
distinction between effectiveness and efficiency.
The first point is that strategic management can be
divided into two phases: strategy formulation ("deciding
what to do") and strategy implementation ("achieving
results"). (Quinn, et al., 1988, p. 45) However, implemen-
tation issues must be considered during strategy formulation
because of the need for holistic and continuous thinking.
Strategy implementation consists of control and evaluation
techniques that provide timely feedback. Feedback is
necessary for consideration in continuous formulation think-
ing, resulting in possible adjustment, change or cancellation
to the current strategy.
The second point needing emphasis is that strategy
formulation phase comprises both goal formulation (the what)
and the means to accomplish those goals through strategy
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formulation (the how) . "Strategy is the broader concept that
includes both goals and the plans designed to bring them to
reality." (Heymann, 1987, p. 17) Because service roles are
delineated by law and missions assigned by the chain of
command, goal formulation can easily be forgotten or isolated
from strategy formulation. However, these goals still must be
translated by the service, in its service planning process,
into something that is understood, achievable and effective.
Although ends (goals) and means (strategy) alternatives maybe
devised separately, the final strategic decision making
process must consider them simultaneously.
The final point differentiates between efficiency and
effectiveness. Strategic management assists the organization
in choosing effective goals ("doing the right things") that
will enable it to survive and succeed. The major limitation
of long-range planning is its narrow outlook that concentrates
on improving organizational efficiency ("doing things right")
.
(Stoner, Wankel, 1986, p. 9) This may or may not be the key
for organizational success. Even though efficiency is vital
for organizational survival, by emphasizing effectiveness an
organization can be better prepared to anticipate changes in
the environment. An effective strategic management process
acts as an "early warning system" that would allow an
organization to develop and apply an appropriate strategy to
guide necessary organizational change to better meet new
threats or take advantage of new opportunities. (Smith,
11
Allen, Stewart, Whitehouse, 1987, p. 27) Identifying a need
for change, formulating goals and subsequent strategies that
enable an organization to better adapt to its environment is
strategic management and the purpose of the service planning
process.
In the corporate world, strategic management should
answer the coiestion, "VThat business should we be in?" In a
military context, strategic management should answer the
question "What is the most effective fighting organization and
how can we field it?" This may mean sacrificing artillery
range and tank quality (efficiency) for greater mobility and
supportability (effectiveness) . Or this may mean contemplat-
ing a Marine Corps with unmanned aircraft and the necessary
changes to doctrine, structure and training it would entail.
Military strategy will answer the question, "When and where is
the most effective place for this organization to fight?"
An appropriate analogy would be viewing the entire
Marine Corps as a sword. The continual forging and tempering
of this sword (making strategic changes in doctrine, struc-
ture/organization, education/training, and material/equipment)
to give it shape, make it strong and keep the edge sharp is
strategic management and the goal of the service planning
process. The unsheathing and striking of the sword is the
domain of political and military strategy. If the Marine
Corps is the Nation's sword and the Nation's senior leaders
12





Goals are the ultimate, long-range desires of an
organization. They are open-ended, difficult to measure and
usually not achievable. (Hofer, Schendel, 1978, p. 20) A
goal is what John Bryson considers a vision of success: "a
description of what it (the organization) should look like as
it successfully implements its strategies and achieves its




Objectives are intermediate targets on the path to a
goal. They are measurable, have a deadline in which to be
accomplished and are achievable. (Hofer, Schendel, 1978, p.
21)
7 Policies
"Rules or guidelines that express the limits within
which action should occur. These rules often take the form of
contingent decisions for resolving conflicts among specific
objectives." (Quinn, et . al., 1988, p. 3)
8 Programs
"Specify the step-by-step seguence of actions
necessary to achieve major objectives (goals) . They express
how objectives will be achieved within the limits set by
policy." (Quinn, et al., 1988, p. 3)
13
9 . Doctrine
Doctrine is military policies that act as a broad
guide for a leader's actions on the battlefield. "Fundamental
principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide
their actions in support of national objectives. It is
authoritative, but requires judgment in application." (JCS
Pub. 1-02, 1987, p. 118) In a larger sense, doctrine can also
act as a cultural control mechanism by providing broad
guidance for an organization's daily actions and especially
during combat in the absence of specific orders.
10. Tactics
"The art and science of winning engagements and
battles. It includes the use of firepower and maneuver, the
integration of different arms, and the immediate exploitation
of success to defeat the enemy." (FMFM 1, 1989, p. 23)
11. Roles
The Marine Corps' Congressionally assigned functions
and responsibilities, as contained in the National Security





Purpose or raison d'etre of an organization. The
"common thread": "that enables outsiders to perceive where a
firm is heading and inside management to give it guidance."
(Quinn, et al., 1988, p. 10) It is based on an organization's
mandates and the shared values of its stakeholders. A
14
military mission is: "the task , together with the purpose,
which clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason
therefor." (JCS Pub. 1-02, 1987, p. 236)
13 . Campaign Plan
A campaign plan is: "a plan for a series of related
military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective
within a given time and space." (JCS Pub. 1-02, 1987, p. 60)
This term pertains to military operations, but the idea is
also applied to the preparation of combat forces. (FMFM-1,
1989, p. 86) Therefore, a campaign plan can provide strategic
direction for organizational development and change.
14 . Maneuver Warfare
Maneuver warfare departs from the traditional
attrition style of warfare which emphasizes massed forces,
centralized control, and specifically defined goals to
physically destroy the enemy.
Maneuver warfare, by contrast, seeks victory by destroying
the enemy's ability to fight in an organized, effective way.
Move faster; endure longer; react to changing circumstances
better; strike in unexpected places in unexpected ways; go
after the enemy's command centers and communications
networks, not his main forces.
But in order to work, maneuver warfare requires extreme
mental agility and great trust between senior and subordi-
nate officers. Commanders must give mission orders,
specifying what they want done, not how to do it. Leaders
at all levels, once they know their commander's general
intentions, must exercise personal initiative in finding the
best way to carry them out. Everybody must be able to
disregard old plans and adopt new ones rapidly as circum-
stances change. And maneuver warfare requires, in
peacetime, a system that rewards these qualities. Leaders
must be allowed, even encouraged, to make mistakes in
training—a challenge for any military establishment, where.
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in peacetime, promotions often go to those with clean
records and scant creativity. (Gold, 1989, p. 16)
As will be discussed later in this thesis, maneuver warfare
was pronounced, by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, as the
official warfighting philosophy and doctrine of the Marine
Corps
.
E. MARINE CORPS CONFIGURATION AND CONTEXT
Important in discussing strategic management is the need
to understand the configuration of the organization being
studied and its environment. By configuration we mean the
arrangement of parts of an organization such as structure,
support systems, power and culture that fit various
situations. These situations are called contexts. (Quinn,
et al., 1988, p. 572) Essentially, the Marine Corps is
configured like a bureaucracy. The characteristics of a
"machine bureaucracy" include:
...highly specialized, routine operating tasks; very
formalized procedures in the operating core; a proliferation
of rules, regulations, and formalized communication
throughout the organization; large sized units at the
operating level reliance on the functional basis for group
tasks; relatively centralized power for decision making; and
an elaborate administrative structure with a sharp
distinction between line and staff. (Quinn, et al., 1988,
p. 547)
There is a heavy entrepreneurial flavor to its strategy
making because of political and certain organizational
circumstances (contexts) . As will be described in Chapter III
and discussed in Chapter IV, the Marine Corps service strategy
process is a hybrid of these two types.
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F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II will provide necessary background data on DoD
structure, processes and planning systems and other external
pressures, as well as, internal leadership initiatives
effecting the service planning process.
Chapter III will describe the Marine Corps service
strategy formulation process and modes of implementation using
a service planning model.
Chapter IV will establish criteria and analyze the service
planning process described in Chapter III. It will point out
strengths and weaknesses in the service planning process as
well the barriers to effective strategic management in the
Marine Corps.





This Chapter is designed to acquaint the reader with the
various military structures and processes which make up the
ever-changing backdrop for the Marine Corps' evolving service
planning process. Additionally, the external and internal
forces effecting how the Marine Corps accomplishes its service
planning from the formulation to the implementation, will be
discussed. The service planning process encompasses the
formal and informal processes which steer the actions,
thinking, and planning efforts of the Marine Corps.
For the Marine Corps, numerous external pressures and
internal initiatives introduced in the past few years have
resulted in an "overhaul" of the Marine Corps service planning
process and how it conducts its business. The changing
environment in the form of new political guidance from the
Executive Branch, DoD, and Congress, as well as new direction
from sources internal to the Marine Corps, coupled with the
uncertain international security climate, and the anticipated
continual diminishment of resources, have acted as catalysts
for the Marine Corps to pursue significant changes in their
service planning methodology. Also, the dynamics of the new
Commandant has had a prepotent effect on the operations and
behavior of the Marine Corps. These external and internal
18
forces further compelled the Marine Corps to formally link its
actions with its plans. (Weeks, Pelli, 1987)
In terms of the formal structured planning process, the
Marine Corps has substantially revised its service planning
procedures. Although planning has always been acknowledged as
one of the most important tasks of management in an
organization, in recent years, increased attention has been
focused on the military service planning process. As
previously indicated, service planning attempts to integrate
planning, programming, and budgeting with national military
strategy. From James Stoner's and Charles Wankel's definition
of management, as provided in Chapter I of this thesis, it is
evident that planning in an important part of management.
Stoner and Wankel elaborate further by stating, "Before
managers can organize, lead, and control, they must make plans
that give purpose and direction to the organization, deciding
what needs to be done, when and how it needs to be done, and
who is to do it." (Stoner, Wankel, 1986, p. 4) Planning is
a means for top-management to communicate their "vision of the
future" and as discussed earlier, planning, as a component
part of both strategy and management is integral to strategic
management.
To enhance the service planning process and make it an
effective guidance tool for decision making, the Marine Corps
began developing a new service planning procedure to integrate
its overall planning with national military strategy. The
19
formal structured service planning process, which the Marine
Corps calls the Concept-Based Requirements System (CBRS) , will
be discussed in detail in Chapter III of this thesis, as well
as to how the dynamics of the new leadership has effected the
actions of the Marine Corps. First, we will review the major
DoD planning systems which have a direct bearing on service
planning, followed by a discussion of the external and
internal factors influencing the evolution of the Marine Corps
service planning.
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) PLANNING SYSTEMS
DoD is a large and complex organization, so we will begin
by first describing the command structure and organization of
this Department. All the functions in DoD and its component
agencies are perfoirmed under the general "direction,
authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense." (MCI-
7701E, 1984, p. 7) DoD is structured to accomplish the
Congressional intent as expressed in the National Security Act
of 1947, as amended, the DoD Reorganization Act of 1954 and
the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Basically, the Department
of Defense includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
JCS, various defense agencies, military departments and the
military services within those departments, and the unified
and specified commands. The basic structure of DoD, as
delineated by John H. Cushman, is organized into "providers"
and "combatants" and is displayed in Figure 2-1. (Gardner, et.
20








































































QPEnATIONAL BESPONSIBIIITIES SUPPORT RESPONSIBIIITIES
Figure 2-1 Organization for National Security
(0H-3-1A, 1987, p. 2-6)
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al., 1978) The "providers" of the military forces are the
civilian run miliary departments (Army, Air Force, Navy) and
their respective military services. The "providers" are
responsible for the preparation of combat forces, but not
their employment. The preparation of a combat organization is
accomplished by strategically managing four critical areas:
doctrine, structure/organization, training/education, and
material/equipment. (Weeks, Pelli, 1987) The "combatants"
are the unified and specified commands who are responsible for
combat force employment. The unified and specified commands
and their assigned combat forces are directly responsible to
the National Command Authority (NCA) through the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) . The Marine Corps is unique
in that it is a separate service within the Department of the
Navy. The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) falls under
the purview of the Secretary of the Navy and is a full member
of the JCS.
To handle the complex problems of establishing strategic
direction, determining military policy, making resource
allocation decisions, and finally translating the funded
military capabilities into plans for military operations, DoD
uses several complex, interwoven, and extremely involved
planning systems and processes. At the service level, the
service planning process must also be knitted into the DoD
planning processes network. To fully understand the service
planning process, and the influencing factors driving it, it
22
is important to understand the DoD planning systems and their
documentation, as well as the interrelationships of these
systems. Before discussing the evolution of Marine Corps
service planning system, a brief overview of the applicable
DoD planning systems will be provided. The DoD planning
systems which directly effect the service planning process
include the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) , the
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) , and the
DoD Acquisition Process.
1 . Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)
It is through the JSPS that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) : 1) give military advice to the President and Secretary
of Defense, 2) establish the strategic foundation for the
Secretary of Defense's Defense Guidance (DG) , 3) sets guidance
and apportions resources for contingency planning, 4)
furnishes planning continuity for the strategic planning
process, and 5) provides input into the PPBS. (0H-3-1A, 1987)
The JSPS is the Joint Chiefs of Staff's planning method for
coordinating and integrating both force development planning
(PPBS) and planning for the operational use of military force
(JOPS) for all the services. The JSPS uses a series of
complimentary documents to accomplish the strategic responsi-
bilities of the JCS. The JCS prepares six documents which
directly or indirectly guide the military departments in
planning, programming and budgeting, in addition to providing
guidance to the unified and specified commanders. The JSPS
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planning documents cover intelligence priorities and
estimates, roles of U.S. military power, required force
structure, projected military capabilities, and risks inherent
in current force composition and capabilities. These
documents, which interface into the PPBS and the service
planning process, are summarized in Figure 2-2 and include the
following.
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Figure 2-2 Joint Strategic Planning System Documents
(0H-3-1A, 1987, p. 5-4)
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a. Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning
(IPSP)
The IPSP advises the Services and CINC's on what
their intelligence requirements, priorities, planning, and
collection efforts ought to be. The IPSP also advises the
Secretary of Defense and the Director, CIA of the military
intelligence requirements and priorities required to support
the national military strategy.
b. Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP)
The JEIP represents the principal intelligence
basis for the JSPS. The JEIP is derived from the IPSP and
contains intelligence from the entire intelligence community
to include the CIA, DIA, and the Services as well as the
Essential Elements of Information (EEI) from the CINC's. The
JIEP further provides intelligence estimates on possible
worldwide and regional areas of concern that could affect the
U.S. national security.
c. Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD)
The JSPD is the principle document that advises
the President, National Security Agency and the Secretary of
Defense on the military strategy and force structure required
to support the national security objectives. The JSPD
provides a comprehensive appraisal of the threat to U.S.
interests and objectives, a statement of recommended military
objectives, and the recommended military strategy required to
obtain the national objectives. The primary supporting
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analysis for developing the JSPD comes from an internal to the
OJCS document called the Joint Strategic Planning Document
Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA) . This document analyses the
minimal risk force and develops the planning force that is
presented in the JSPD. The JSPDSA consists of three parts:
Part I
—
Strategy and Force Planning Guidance . Part II—
Analysis and Force Requirements—Minimum Risk Force , and Part
III
—
Analysis and Force Requirements—Planning Force . (It
should be noted that it is anticipated that the JSPDSA will be
replaced by three JSPD supporting documents called the
Planning Guidance, Military Net Assessment, and the Planning
Force.) (AFSC Pub 1, 1988)
d. Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM)
The JPAM is a risk assessment document and
provides the Secretary of Defense the views of the JCS
concerning the adequacy and capabilities of the total forces
contained in the composite Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
.
Further it assesses the risk inherent in those force
capabilities and estimates the abilities of the composite POM
to execute the national military strategy.
e. Joint Security Assistance Memorandum (JSAM)
The JSAM is an assessment of the security
assistance capabilities programmed in the State Department's
budget. The JSAM provides a military view of the security
assistance capabilities and is based on an analysis of U.S.
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military interests, strategic goals, national objectives and
anticipated force levels.
f. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)
The JSCP serves as a planning directive for the
commanders of unified and specified commands, in addition to
the Chiefs of the Services, for the accomplishment of military
tasks in the short range period (two years) . The taskings are
based on intelligence information, Secretary of Defense
guidance, and the forces expected to be available during the
two year planning period. The JSCP represents the last phase
of the JSPS and it informs the appropriate commanders how to
use the outputs from the PPBS. (AFSC Pub 1, 1988)
2 . The Planning. Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
The PPBS is DoD's formal process for making funding
allocation decisions. The JCS has a significant part in the
PPBS and it is through the JSPS that they provide their
requisite background and guidance. The JSPS-PPBS interactions
and relationships are displayed in Figure 2-3. "The planning
and programming portion of the PPBS is essentially a series of
exchanges between the Secretary of Defense and the Military
Departments/OJCS resulting in the formulation of defense
programs." (Draft Planners Reference Manual, 1983, p. 3-4-1)
Although the PPBS is an iterative and continuous
process, for the military services the cycle begins when the
JCS issues the JSPD, which provides the Secretary of Defense














































Figure 2-3 JSPS-PPBS Relationships
(0H-3-1A, 1987, p. 2-6)
needed to give reasonable assurance of countering the threat.
It should be remembered that the JSPD is a derivative of the
JSPDSA documents and the antecedent intelligence documents
(IPSP and JIEP) . After reviewing the JSPD and other inputs on
military objectives and force levels, the Secretary of Defense
issues his Defense Guidance (DG) . The DG provides the basis
for force planning/programming and establishes fiscal
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establishes fiscal constraints for the development of the
Service's POM. The DG signals the end of the planning phase
of the PPBS.
Based on the guidance contained in the DG document,
each service develops their POM which contains their
objectives for forces, weapon systems, and supporting programs
within the fiscal limitations set in the DG. The POM's
represent the total program requirements for the years covered
in the DG. POM's must also include annexes that show how they
have responded to the requirements of the unified and
specified commanders. Additionally, the POM provides the
rationale for any proposed changes to the Five Year Defense
Plan (FYDP) . The Service POM's are sent to the Secretary of
Defense and JCS
.
The JCS provide their assessment of the composite POM
to the Secretary of Defense via the JPAM. The JPAM compares
the JSPD planning force with the composite POM force
recommendations and includes the JCS views on the balance,
risks, and capabilities of the POM's forces to execute
national military strategy. After reviewing the POM's, JPAM,
and having major issues and proposed changes resolved by the
Defense Resources Board (DRB) , the Secretary of Defense
conveys his decisions in a document called the Program
Decision Memorandum (PDM) . The PDM forms the base for the
services' budget submissions. The PMD marks the end of the
programming phase of the PPBS.
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The services next develop their budget estimates which
are submitted through the chain of command to the Secretary of
Defense and 0MB for review and approval. This review and
resultant resolved issues culminates in a series of Program
Budget Decision (PBDs) which addresses the allocation of
resources contained in each services' budget estimate.
Finally, the DoD input into the President's Budget is based on
the Secretary of Defense's final decisions regarding the
budget estimates submitted by each DoD component. The
President's Budget is then forwarded to Congress for review
and adjustment. Once the President signs the Congressional
appropriations and authorization acts into law, 0MB apportions
funds to the various military departments. This is followed
by the preparation of the JSCP by the JCS. The JSCP contains
guidance for the unified and specified commanders, and the
services for the accomplishment of the military tasks in the
short-term range. From the joint perspective, the planning
phase of the PPBS begins when the commanders analyze the
scenario, tasks, and threat contained in the precedent JSCP.
(AFCS Pub 1, 1988)
The final defense budget has far reaching impacts,
long-term conseguences, and vast implications, not only for
the defensive posture of the country, but also for the overall
health of the U.S. economy. It therefore highly scrutinized
and extensively reviewed throughout DoD and Congress.
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For many reasons the defense budget is one of the most
important documents produced within the U.S. political
system. .
.
,The defense budget is the linchpin of any national
security policy. Plans are basically irrelevant and
operations virtually impossible until forces and weapons to
support them have been purchased. (Kruzel, Korb, 1986, p.
52)
Although the PPBS is the formal force development planning
system, the focus is on short term budgeting and equipment
acquisition programming and not truly on long-term force
development planning. Unfortunately, the pressures of the
budget cycle lead to decisions being made on a short-term,
issue by issue basis with inadvertence being shown towards the
longer term objectives and the overall broad policies.
(Kruzel, Korb, 1986)
As a final note on the Marine Corps participation in
the PPBS, it should be noted that the Marine Corps involvement
in the PPBS entails a mixture of both Marine Corps and Navy
appropriations. The Marine Corps budget submission is
eventually combined with the Navy's budget submission to form
the DoN budget submission. Therefore, continuous coordination
within both the Marine Corps and the Navy is essential.
3 . Department of Defense's Acquisition Process
The execution of the PPBS within the Marine Corps must
be responsive to, and operate within the guidelines and
resultant interactions of the JSPS, DoD and Department of the
Navy PPBS, and Congressional budget cycles. Adjunct and
complementary to this is the acquisition process. The
acquisition of a new weapon system or other military equipment
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is a complicated, detailed, and often lengthy process.
Although many risks and uncertainties are inherent in the
acquisition of new systems, the DoD acquisition system
attempts to reduce these risks and is designed to provide an
efficient and effective method of acquiring new systems with
the use of a uniform set of procedures. The DoD acquisition
process normally is divided into four phases, although it can
be altered to meet the special needs of a particular system or
minimize acquisition time and life-cycle costs, consistent
with urgency and technical risk involved. The four phases,
which are separated by decision milestones, are shown in
Figure 2-4 and consist of the: 1) Conceptual Exploration
Phase, 2) Demonstration and Validation Phase, 3) Full Scale
Development Phase, and 4) Production and Deployment Phase.
(Tactical Systems Acquisition Manual, 1989)
The DoD Acquisition System is tied directly to the
PPBS and JSPS and must be closely coordinated and monitored
within those two systems. The PPBS provides the fuel (money)
and the JSPS shifts the gears for the acquisition machine.
The Acquisition Strategy Guide , published by the Defense
Systems Management College, states;
To understand acquisition strategy and place it in proper
perspective at the program level, the Program Manager should
have an appreciation for the relationship between National
Security strategic planning and the acquisition major
defense systems. (ASG, 1984, p. 21)
The acquisition process is a costly and time consuming















































Figure 2-4 DoD Acquisition System (Tactical
Systems Acquisition Manual, 1989)
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that does not live up to its expectations. For these reasons,
the DoD Acquisition Process has received much criticism and
many past and present Administrations and Congresses have
taken steps and exerted pressure on DoD to improve the
acquisition process. Additionally, General Gray recognized
that the "existing organization for requirements definition,
research, development, and acquisition contained clear
inefficiencies" within the Marine Corps. (Tactical Systems
Acquisition Manual, 1989, p. i) And one of the goals of
General Gray when he became Commandant was to "insure that we
get the best equipment into the hands of Marines in the
shortest possible time." (Tactical Systems Acquisition
Manual, 1989, p. i) As a result, significant organizational
changes were made by the Commandant to improve the acquisition
process within the Marine Corps. These organizational changes
will be described later in this thesis.
C. EXTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING SERVICE PLANNING CHANGES
The external factors influencing the Marine Corps service
planning process are, for the most part, the same factors
effecting the DoD planning processes. The primary external
forces directly involved in shaping DoD are the Administration
of the President who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces; the Congress, which reflects the national mood,
resource availability, and world events; and advances in
technology.
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As a result of the increasing discontentment with the
rising defense budget, concernment with the military problems
encountered in Lebanon and Grenada, and dissatisfaction with
the DOD planning systems, the Administration and Congress
implemented several initiatives during the 1980 's to review
and improve the way DoD conducts its business. First we will
discuss the major Administration's initiatives, followed by
the Congressional actions intended to improve the our
defensive posture. Then a terse overview of technology's role
and potential effects it may have on the planning process.
1 . Packard Commission
During 1986, President Reagan's Blue Ribbon Commission
on Defense Management, commonly referred to as the Packard
Commission, issued its report on the national security
planning and budgeting. The Packard Commission was tasked
with finding ways to improve the effectiveness and stability
of defense resource allocation, including the legislative
process. The Packard Commission's charter included:
...the budget process, the procurement system, legislative
oversight, and the organizational and operational
arrangements, both formal and informal, among the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Command system,
the Military Departments, and the Congress. (HASC No. 99-
53, 1987, p. 469)
Shortly after the submission of the Commission's interim
report, David Packard, Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Commission,
summed up the key recommendations before a Congressional
hearing on the matter. In part, his prepared statement said:
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1. Effective long-range planning, beginning at the front
end of the process, to produce a defense strategy and budget
based on national security objectives.
2. Increasing the responsibility of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of staff and getting him deeply involved in
this planning process, and
3. Most importantly, running the Defense Acquisition
process like you would a successful commercial business.
The only difference is that the shareholders are the
American taxpayers and the profit incentive is world peace.
(HASC No. 99-53, 1987, p. 459)
In essence, the Commission's study revealed that DoD and its
components needed to improve long range planning, align
authority and responsibility, stabilize the acquisition
process, and streamline the bureaucracy. All of which
affected the way DoD and the services plan. The National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) #219 signed by President
Reagan in April 1986 implemented the recommendations of the
Packard Commission's interim report. The Packard Commission
and subsequent NSDD #219 were the driving forces from the
Administration for the services to review their planning
procedures and develop military programs which supported the
national security objectives.
2 . Concfress
Appropriately, Congress is the most significant and
influential external force affecting the way DoD is organized,
the way it conducts business, and the way it plans. Congress
grants approval and funds for all defense programs. It
mandates manpower levels, determines how many divisions will
be maintained, and decides which weapons systems will be
purchased. Congressional committees and subcommittees monitor
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and pose an ever increasing influence on the management and
"oversight" of DoD. Congress has acquired an urge to direct
DoD to change course and in the past few years several laws
have been legislated resulting in new directions, regulations,
and organizations for DoD. (Kruzel, Korb, 1986)
Recently Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act) as amended by the Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of
1987 (1987 Reaffirmation Act). These pieces of legislation
mandated a deficit reduction and sent a resounding signal of
Congress's intention to reduce federal spending. The
anticipated reduction in the availability of resources will
most assuredly require DoD and its components to improve its
planning and program justifications to ensure they support the
national strategy. The effects of the deficit reduction
efforts were echoed by General Gray. "The greatest issue the
Congress and Marine Corps jointly face is how our forces can
best contribute to national security within the constraints of
the budget." (Gray, 1989, p. 22)
Congress also enacted the DoD Reorganization Act of
1986. In addition to reinforcing the basic constitutional
principle of civilian control of the military, this Act, also
referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, mandated actions to
improve joint military operations and capabilities. It also
projected Congressional interests and emphasis on joint
military efforts and the services contribution to the national
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security. This and other subsequent Congressional actions
(Congressional committee hearings. Congressional military
reviews, etc.) have indicated:
...that Congress intends to spend money only on those forces
and programs that support the national strategy ... .The
Reagan Administration and Congress have served warning that
each service must program and budget its future in the
context of a joint effort. The Marine Corps force
development plan must, therefore, support our claim that the
Corps continues to make a unique contribution to national
defense, and thus remains the best buy in town. (Weeks,
Pelli, 1987, p. 34)
3 . Technology
Technology also represents an external influential
pressure on military planning because, like politics—both
national and international, and resource allocation,
technology also effects the national strategy. Advancements
in technology can and has affected military organization,
force structure and doctrine. The technological advancement
of nuclear weapons immediately made the U.S. the most powerful
nation in the world at that time. "For decades after World
War II it appeared that America would reign indefinitely as
the world's technological superpower." (Burgelman, Maidique,
1988, p. 1) Although maintaining the technological advantage
is extremely difficult, the advent of the atom bomb
demonstrates the powerful impact technology can achieve. In
the last century, technology has had a growing impact on the
military and in can even drive the planning process if the
planners start reacting to technology instead of seeking and
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developing technology which supports the goals and missions of
the organization. (Ferrell, 1981)
D. INTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING SERVICE PLANNING CHANGES
1. Center for Naval Analysis fCNA) Study
During 1984, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA)
released a study of the Marine Corps long range planning
system. The study found major faults with the Marine Corps
planning system and determined that "Long-range planning in
the Marine Corps had become a largely meaningless bureaucratic
exercise." (CNA Study, 1984, p .1) The study further
concluded that the service planning procedure lacked substance
and credibility. For planning to be effective, it must be
directed and initiated from the top (the Commandant) , with
active participation of top-level managers
—
(Strategic players
—general officers, staff, etc.) throughout the entire
process. However, the study found that the long-range plan
was put together with little guidance from the Commandant and
no input from the general officers who would be responsible
for its implementation. Additionally, the study concluded
that the mid-range plan was treated with "disdain by those
primarily concerned with programming. If action officers at
HQMC made a connection between these plans, it was only by
coincidence." (Weeks, Pelli, 1987, p. 34) The three plans
produced by the planning system did not guide the decisions
being made and there proved to be little correlation between
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Marine Corps actions and its plans. The Marine Corps planning
had become academic, with its main purpose being to produce
documents instead of producing guidance and direction. As a
result of this study, the Marine Corps began exploring ways to
conjoin service planning and programming with the national
strategy, even before the deliberations by the Packard
Commission had begun.
2 . Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC)
Obviously, the most influential factor, internal to
the Marine Corps, affecting planning is the Commandant. The
degree of support and involvement of the top-executive will
determine the effectiveness of the organizations planning
efforts. Also the degree the top-level management
participates in the planning process will determine its
strategic importance to the organization. The Commandant is
the chief planner and establishes the planning climate for the
Marine Corps. General Gray has taken an extremely active part
in projecting the Marine Corps into the future. Testifying
before a Senate Armed Services Subcommittee General Gray
stated:
The target in our sight picture is the Marine Corps at the
turn of the century. We think our plans will take us where
we should be ten years from now. They are measured and
deliberate, however, so that as we change, we will not limit
our ability to respond. We are the Nation's dedicated
expeditionary force, ready to go on moment's notice, by any
means, to any place on the globe where we are needed.
(Gray, 1988, p. 9)
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Additionally, the Commandant recognized the need for all
Marines to understand the strategic direction of the Marine
Corps and has traveled extensively throughout the Marine Corps
to expound his vision of the Corps and its future.
General Gray quickly established himself as the
Commandant of the Marine Corps and almost immediately
implemented many of his ideas and concepts with his "let's get
it done" attitude. "General Gray has assumed a nonsense
approach to getting on with the program. Specially, he has
turned ideas which have been talked about for years into his
present-day initiatives, and he's making them happen in his
first six months." (Scharfen, 1988, p. 161) However,
planning is an extremely important way to achieve an
organizations goals and accomplish its missions, especially
when funding, manpower, and time constraints exist, as they do
in our present world. Not all strategic ideas can be
immediately implemented and will have to be nurtured over
time, phased in, delayed, or implemented at the cost of other
programs.
Several initiatives were difficult to implement because
manning and resources did not increase in either the past or
present year's budget. We did, however, accomplish these
changes through significant and, in some cases, painful
allocations of manpower from within our operating forces and
supporting establishment. (Gray, 1989, p. 174)
A diminishing budget effects all facets of the military
establishment: manpower, training, weapons procurement,
research, develpoment, facilities, and all maintenance. As
41
resources become more austere, planning becomes acutely more
critical. A plan which implements the strategic ideas and
changes of the top planner (CMC) becomes an integral part of
the strategic management of the organization. The Commandant
of the Marine Corps is the single most significant internal
influence on how the Marine Corps acts, thinks, and plans. In
the ensuing chapters, the impact of the new Commandant and the
service planning methodology will be discussed at length.
E. SUMMARY
During the 1980 's, numerous external and internal
pressures have forced the Marine Corps to review its service
planning process and adopt a new methodology. These pressures
refocused the service planning process of the Marine Corps and
caused significant changes in the action, thinking, and
planning efforts of the Marine Corps. In the next chapters,
the service planning process of the Marine Corps will be
discribed and then analyzed to determine if it is
strategically managed.
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III. MARINE CORPS SERVICE PLANNING PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
The decade of the 1980 's had been both good and bad to the
Marine Corps. On the good side, the Marine Corps had
benefited greatly from Reagan's rejuvenation of the country's
military structure. This allowed the Marine Corps to
modernize its forces, equipment and facilities. But the
1980 's also had its dark sides. Several events had combined
together to cloud the Marine Corps reputation and self-esteem.
Events such as the Beirut Bombing, Moscow Security Guard
Scandal and Oliver North's involvement in the Iranian-arms
deal fiasco, coupled with a bureaucratic mist which seemed to
surround the Marine Corps served to damage the Corps' standing
within Congress, the general public and the Marine Corps
itself.
The Marines were coming off years of bereavement over the
bombing deaths in Beirut and embarrassment by the security
guard scandals in Moscow. The Corps was a "downer" with the
public and almost rock bottom in the hall of Congress.
(Jones, 1988, p. 16)
In 1987, a drawing of a Marine in the blue dress uniform
sporting a black eye appeared on the cover of Time
magazine. ... Inside an article speculated on the damage
incurred in the "Marine Spy Scandal" ... .Evidently, articles
like Time 's have not cost the Marine Corps a single recruit,
weapons system, manpower space, strategic commitment, or
facility. But harm was done to the Corps' most valuable
asset— its reputation. (Scharfen, 1988, p. 160)
But even as the Marines continued to assimilate the new
equipment and train the new, high quality people, it was
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becoming clear that something was still amiss. Some
considered the Corps too bureaucratized, its senior officers
too politicized, its doctrine and tactics outmoded. And
many Marines, like members of an athletic team with more
talent than focus, began hoping for leaders who would really
shake things up. (Gold, 1989, p. 9)
For the last two or three years the Marine Corps has been
mired in a bureaucratic bog. The Marine Corps senior
leadership became a group of programmatic thinkers whose
acquisition policy appeared to be "How much can we get"
rather than "What do we need most to accomplish our
mission"? We had lost our credibility, and our backing in
Congress; we had alienated our senior retired community: and
many in the young officer corps doubted our ability to
fight. I think we had lost our uniqueness and were rapidly
becoming just another service. At the highest levels we
became paranoid. What, at times was honest criticism of our
Corps, became a personal affront, and was treated as such.
The Marine Corps needed a "shaking up" and Al Gray has
started that process. .. .He is a determined, practical
visionary, possessing boundless enthusiasm. With luck he
could be the most important impact on the Marine Corps, not
only for 1987, but for the next decade. (Scharfen, 1988,
p. 161)
The events described above, accompanied with the influencing
factors discussed in Chapter II, such as Goldwater-Nichols
Act, the Packard Commission study, the CNA long-range planning
study and, most of all, the selection of a new Commandant,
created an atmosphere for change for the Marine Corps.
Certainly the most predominate determinate of change for the
Marine Corps has been the appointment, on 1 July 1987, of
General Al Gray as Commandant. This thought is reflected in
the comment, "the three greatest impact events in 198 7 for the
Marine Corps were Gray, Gray and Gray." (Scharfen, 1988, p.
161)
The external pressures and internal initiatives led by
General Gray, have resulted in the Marine Corps adoption of a
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new service planning methodology. This process, combined with
the dynamics of the new Commandant, has caused significant
changes in the way the Marine Corps acts, thinks, and plans.
In this chapter we will describe the service planning process,
the continual forging and tempering of the organization.
The service planning process consists of two interwoven,
overlapping and interacting phases. These phases are the
strategy formulation phase (deciding what to do) and they
strategy implementation phase (achieving results) . While
formulation and implementation issues are difficult to
separate in real life, we will make the distinction between
the two phases, to allow for a more organized description and
subsequent analysis of the process. The two phases of the
service planning process will be discussed in detail later in
this chapter. However, we will begin by providing a brief
overview and descriptive model of the Marine Corps Service
Planning Process.
B. DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF THE MARINE CORPS SERVICE PLANNING
PROCESS
The Marine Corps planning process encompasses the formal
and informal processes which shape the actions, thinking, and
planning efforts of the Marine Corps. A model of the Marine
Corps service planning process is depicted in Figure 3-1 and
is based on output factors. The model portrays a very




















































appears to show the strategic process as an orderly step-by-
step process with a beginning and end point with distinct and
discernible components, it must be remembered that the actual
process is iterative, interlocking and continuous.
The Commandant, as the Service Chief, is responsible for
the service planning process. As such, he is the key strategy
formulator and the propellent of its implementation.
Additionally, the Commandant, who fulfills a dual role as a
member of the Joint Chiefs and the Service Chief, must also
link together the external and internal environment to achieve
the end results—combat ready Marines.
The formulation phase of the service planning process is:
"the process of developing long-range plans to deal
effectively with the environmental opportunities and threats
in light of corporate strengths and weaknesses." (Wheelen,
Hunger, 1986, p. 12) This includes defining the missions,
objectives and strategies of the organization. The model only
displays the service planning process in the context of key
input variables (internal and external environment) and the
key output documents (MCCP, Umbrella Concept, MLRP, etc.).
However, the formulation process is primarily analytical and
the model does not reflect "how" the process occurs.
Therefore the formulation section later in this chapter will,
in addition to discussing the output documents, provide a
detailed description of the key activities of the formulation
process. The formulation process can be likened to the
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forging of a sword, where the organization is heated and
worked into a desired shape.
The strategy implementation phase is "the process of
putting strategies and policies into action." (Wheelen,
Hanger, 1986, p. 13) The implementation phase occurs in three
modes: formal mode, through the structured systematic service
planning process (from the MMP and supftorting plans through
the POM and resources) ; the informal mode, immediate field
execution without delay and aid from the formal planning
system; and the interactive mode, a combination and
interaction of the first two modes. Implementation is similar
to tempering as the heated sword is cooled at a calculated
rate to achieve not only its desired shape, but its optimal
flexibility and hardness as well.
The model represents a simplified version of the service
planning process and will provide for a better understanding
of the overall system and should be helpful when the two
phases— formulation and implementation—are separated and
discussed in detail in the next sections.
C. THE FORMULATION PROCESS: FORGING THE SWORD
The formulation phase of the service planning process is
a very fluid, dynamic, non-explicit, non-sequential,
concurrent and for the most part intuitively performed. To
better describe the key activities of the formulation process
they have been broken down into four interrelated steps.
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These steps include: 1) Strategic Assessment of Current
Performance—an assessment of the organization's current
performance/results in light of the current mission,
objectives and strategies; 2) Strategic Environmental
Assessment and Strategic Issue Identification—an analysis of
the external and internal environment and identification of
strategic issues; 3) Strategic Coordination and Analysis
—
coordination and analysis of strategic issues; and 4)
Strategic Evaluation and Selection—the choosing of the
appropriate strategy and course of action.
The formulating process, consisting of the four
interrelated steps, mentioned above, is concerned with
developing the organization's mission, objectives and
strategies. The formulation phase of the CBRS methodology,
recently adopted by the Marine Corps, involves the development
of the MCCP, the Umbrella Concept, the MLRP, and MMP and MMP
supporting planning documents. Therefore, before describing
the four steps in the formulation process, we will briefly
discuss the formal documents produced by the process.
It is through the MCCP that the Commandant provides his
planning guidance for the development of long-range plans and
subsequent planning. The MCCP can best be described from
General Gray's introduction to the MCCP.
The MCCP is the formal means to institutionalize each
Commandant's intent for the Marine Corps of today and
tomorrow. It is planning, policy, and guidance, broad in
scope, which informs and provides direction to the Marine
Corps. The MCCP emphasizes the potential of the Marine
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Corps to contribute to the security needs of the nation. It
guides the maintenance of a combat-ready and capable force
which can be employed rapidly and guarantee success. It also
provides institutional accountability, while educating all
Marines to the process which lead to effective change.
(MCCP, undated, p. 1)
The MCCP does not provide detailed specific directions but is
broad in scope. It reflects the Commandant's "vision of the
future" and his insight into the Nations 's security needs and
priorities. The MCCP provides the strategic direction of the
Marine Corps and covers the entire scope of the Marine Corps
to include warfighting, doctrine, organization, planning,
acquisition, personnel, training, professional military
education, legislative affairs, and public affairs. The MCCP
is intended to provide the requisite front-end focus and
direction for the organization's planning efforts. (Ponnwitz,
1989)
The MCCP is followed by the Umbrella Concept. The
Umbrella Concept is the next document produced in the
formulation phase. The Umbrella Concept is projected out to
about 20 years in the future and translates the applicable CMC
guidance into long-term operational requirements. The
Umbrella Concept contains a brief forecast of the world
environment, battlefield characteristics, and the challenges
to, and capabilities of, the future Marine Corps. It also
includes an overview of potential and most-likely future
missions, threats, and technologies. The Umbrella Concept
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also provides the concept definition and conceptual framework
for the Marine Corps Long-Range Plan. (Ponnwitz, 1989)
It is not likely that the Commandant will compile his
guidance in one document or expressly define which of his
objectives are long or short term. The CBRS process really
begins when the Warfighting Center defines that guidance
through dialogue with the Commandant and his staff and the
consolidation of his speeches, articles, congressional
testimony, and so forth. This definition of the
Commandant's Guidance is the "Umbrella Concept" and forms
the basis for developing the future warfighting capabilities
of the Marine Corps. Once the Umbrella Concept is produced
it must be staffed back to the Commandant to ensure that it
really accurately states his perception of the future
Corps.... The developed concept contains a brief forecast of
the future world environment, the challenges and risks, and
future battlefield characteristics. It also includes
synopses of future probable missions, threats and
technologies balanced with historical experience. The
result should be a description of future MAGTF employment
options, force characteristics, and warfighting concepts.
This also has to be staffed to the Commandant. (Ponnwitz
briefing papers, undated)
The MCCP and the approved Umbrella Concept forms the basis
for the development of the MLRP. The MLRP provides the
requisite broad direction and forward-looking guidance by
defining goals for the Marine Corps in terms of structure,
material, doctrine, and training. The MLRP projects out into
the future 10-20 years. The MLRP "foreshadows likely threats
of the future and what the Corps must be prepared to do in
order to combat them." (MC Gazette, September 1989, p. 4)
The development of the MLRP begins with detailed threat and
technology assessments. These assessments are coupled with
the previously developed concepts from the Umbrella Concept
and the guidance contained in the MCCP to form the long-range
plan. The MLRP's aim is to "steer other conceptual and
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program planners in the development of proposals to change
doctrine, training, force structure, and material, and assist
in the development of innovative tactics, descriptive
concepts, and training and education programs." (Ponnwitz,
1988, p. 2) The purpose of the MLRP is iterated in the
introduction to the MLRP itself.
The purpose of the Marine Corps Long-Range Plan (MLRP) is to
define the goals of the Marine Corps of the future which
guide the development of doctrine, training, force
structure, and material. The MLRP includes a conceptual
base from which the goals are derived; the operational and
supporting concepts of the MLRP provide information to the
National Command Authorities, the Secretaries of the
Military Departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified and
specified commanders, and the Fleet Marine Forces. The MLRP
is designed to be a working document for planners, of
readable length, yet providing broad, forward looking,
meaningful guidance. The period covered by this document is
from the year 2000 to 2010. (MLRP, undated, p. 1-1)
The next step after the MLRP is the development of the
MAGTF Master Plan (MMP) . The MMP is a replacement for the
former Mid-Range Plan. "It is the document that will 'drive
programmers' and shape the Program Objectives Memorandum."
(MC Gazette, September 1989, p. 4) It is through the MMP
effort that the identified goals and deficiencies are adopted
into specific capabilities, developmental efforts, and
programming strategies. The purpose of the MMP is to "bridge
the gap between planning and programming by providing an
integrated list of required capabilities and a prioritized set
of necessary actions." (Ponnwitz, 1988, p. 3) The MMP
identifies and prioritizes MAGTF capabilities which are also
reflected in the subsequent subordinate MAGTF Supporting
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Plans. The MAGTF Supporting Plans are organized into six
volumes as outlined below.
Volume MAGTF Supporting Plan
Vol I Users Guide
Vol II MAGTF Command Plan (MAGTFCP)
Vol III MAGTF Ground Combat Plan (MGCP)
Vol IV MAGTF Aviation Combat Plan (MACP)
Vol V MAGTF Combat Service Support Plan
(MCSSP)
Vol VI Integrated Actions List
The MAGTF Supporting Plans are detailed, action-oriented plans
which are originated directly from the MMP and they focus on
the mission areas of command, ground combat, aviation combat
and combat service support.
The plans address the concepts and major themes of the MMP
by mission area, developing those themes to a greater level
of detail than was appropriate for the MMP. The plans also
prescribe, in phased sequence, and in priority order, the
actions needed in doctrine, organization, training and
education, and equipment to achieve the capabilities
proposed in the MMP. . . .As derivatives plans, the supporting
plans do not deviate from the priorities and overall
operational themes of the MMP. Only in the level of detail
in which various mission areas are developed are the plans
different from the MMP. The Supporting Establishment Master
Plan (SEMP) details the non-FMF actions needed to support
the objectives of the MMP and the other supporting plans but
is not a derivative plan of the MMP. The MMP provides
framing guidance and the MAGTF Supporting Plans provide
detailed actions, which, when taken together, provide the
operational requirements foundation for program objective
memorandum (POM) development. (MAGTF Supporting Plans, Vol.
I, undated, p. 1)
It should be remembered that the CBRS is relatively new to
the Marine Corps and we will not attempt to review or analyze
the content per se of the planning documents produced by the
process, but will concentrate our effort on the planning
process itself.
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Plans are not the objective to be achieved through the
planning. The objective of the planning process is the
establishment of a mission, goals, strategies, programs, and
allocations of resources that will enable the organization
to best cope with and influence uncertain future. (Cleland,
King, 1978, p. 45)
The prime value of the plan may not be in the document itself,
but the process and decisions that have gone into it. As an
old military axiom says, "Plans sometimes may be useless, but
the planning process is always indispensable." (Steiner,
1979, p. 43)
We will now focus our attention on the key activities of
the formulation process and how these documents play in that
process. Once again, it must be remembered that although we
will discuss the formulation process in terms of four steps,
...it is most often an irregular, discontinuous process,
proceeding in fits and starts. These are periods of
stability in strategy development, but also there are
periods of flux, of grouping, of piecemeal change, and of
global change. (Wheelen, Hunger, 1986, p. 141)
1. Strategic Assessment of Current Performance
The strategic assessment of current performance is an
initial assessment and evaluation of the current performance/
results. Upon confirmation as the Commandant, General Gray
already had a feel for where the Marine Corps stood and had
definite ideas on where and how he wanted it to go. After
all, one cannot forget he has been evaluating the Marine Corps
in one capacity or another, from when he first enlisted in the
Marine Corps in 1950 as a private and subsequently
commissioned in 1952 through the ranks to general officer.
54
Additionally, each leader brings with him a wealth of
knowledge and wisdom gained from his experiences. "Every
Commander brings with him the total of his experiences and the
ideas of his people." (Gray, 1988, p. 8) It must also be
considered that when General Gray was recommended by James
Webb, then Secretary of the Navy, he was chosen because of his
philosophy, experience, leadership style and how he viewed the
overall Marine Corps.
"I wanted a man who would be the spiritual leader of the
Corps," he (Webb) says. Gray embodied the warrior ethos he
sought. Further, say Webb, "Al Gray is one of only four or
five generals I've met who really understand military
history, the use of force in different situations, the
utilization of national intelligence assets on the
battlefield—basically, the things that made the general 40
or 50 years ago." (Gold, 1989, p. 9)
As reflected in Grace's comments below, there is no way to
tell precisely how the Commandant viewed the Marine Corps or
the exact analytical processes he used to evaluate the Marine
Corps position.
There is, of course, no way to know exactly what all went
into the Commandant's estimate of the situation as he
assumed his new duties two years ago. Such an estimate is
always the result of a unique, personal mental process
peculiar to the individual making it. It is safe to assume,
however, that it was influenced by more than three decades
of experience and by diligent study of his profession which
has been a trademark of the Commandant's over these many
years. (Grace, 1989, p. 30)
However, strong clues pointing to his view of the Marine
Corps' posture can be gleaned from his public statements and
written correspondence and various Marine Corps articles.
While he emphatically denies the impressions given by the
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media that the Marine Corps was "broken and needs fixing" or
was "lacking" at the time he became Commandant, his
dissatisfaction with many of the facets of the Marine Corps
were evident.
Let me tell you frankly that we need some improvements
before we can claim tactical and operational excellence on
the level of my expectations. .. .We need to bring the same
cohesive thrust to our peacetime training sections.
Therefore, we are creating a Marine Corps Campaign Plan that
give the necessary impetus to our training and exercise
. . . .Our training is going back to the basics to emphasize
battlefield orientation. . . .We are turning on the brain power
to ensure we are using what we've got to our fullest
potential ... .A major effort is being dedicated to studying
our force structure. . . .We are streamlining and reorganizing
our supporting establishment. Marine Corps Headquarters is
being reduced and unnecessary levels of bureaucracy are
being eliminated. .. .Our concern is for the Marine Corps as
a whole, I intend to build on our strength....! intend to
make a number of changes in our policies toward people....!
intend to fill Marine Corps ranks from the bottom up.
(Gray, April 1988, p. 26)
We're going to train hard—make our training tougher, get
better stability; turn on the brain power and develop
ideas. .. .We ' re going to upgrade our standards of training
and education, set higher standards of excellence and
toughen up the recruit training process. We are going to
make sure everybody is a warrior first. We see, then, a
Marine Corps that's fit for service today and that's going
to get better in the months and years ahead. (Gray, May
1988, p. 10)
We're going to ensure that every Marine is a warrior first,
that's not negotiable. (Jordan, 1988, p. 28)
The Marine Corps... will be leaner, tougher, more ready, more
disciplined and more professional. (CMC letter dated May 1,
1989)
Much of General Gray's "vision of success" for the Marine
Corps he brought with him when he assumed the "helm" for the
Marine Corps. And it is this "vision of success" which will
become the basis for the MCCP and subsequent Umbrella Concept
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and MLRP. In addition to the formal planning documents,
General Gray has expended a great effort to ensure his
"vision" of the Marine Corps is understood by all Marines.
During the first 18 months of his tenure as CMC, General Gray
has traveled extensively to "get the Word out" on the
direction he is going to lead the Marine Corps.
(He) has delivered about 150 speeches to almost 100,000
people in more than 100 cities. He's traveled 140,000
miles, met with the Joint Chiefs nearly 100 times and with
the President nine times. He's permitted over 40 media
interviews and numerous press conferences. In these
encounters he makes a point of spreading Marine Corps
doctrine and urges others to do likewise. (Jordan, 1988, p.
28)
Gray goes around the Corps quite a bit, with his vision of
the Corps. .. .Gray ' s words are not pep talks. They are
mission type orders. They are commander's intent; the
results the Commandant wants. Everybody has to move toward
that vision.'^ (Jones, 1988, p. 16)
2 . Assessment of the Strategic Environment and Strategic
Issue Identification
Before strategies can be fully developed, the
Commandant must assess the external and internal environment
and analyze the strategic factors. The external environment
consists of the variables (opportunities and threats) that
exists outside the Marine Corps. The internal environment
consists of the variables (strengths and weaknesses) within
the organization itself. (Wheelen, Hunger, 1986) . After the
strategic environmental assessment, strategic issues must be
identified.
^Navv Times quote from Bill Lind,
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The two major factors impacting on the service
planning process—the external environment and internal
environment—are linked together by the dual role of the
Commandant. The Commandant is both a member of the Joint
Chiefs and a Service Chief. He conducts business in the
external political arenas of the JCS, DoD and Washington D.C.
and translates political desires and tasks, in an understan-
dable and achievable fashion, to his complex, bureaucratic
organization. The Commandant, as Service Chief, is solely
responsible for service strategy, but he is heavily influenced
by both the external and internal environments.
a. The External Environment
The external environment from CMC's perspective
can be broken down into two parts: battlefield requirements
and political considerations. The traditional military
environment, the battlefield, is the main focus when preparing
combat forces. A future battlefield for the Marine Corps
could include a wide range of enemies with a growing
technological capability. Political considerations, in
preparing a combat organization that protects a democratic
society, are also paramount and can not be ignored. Political
forces and factors include the NCA, Congress, DoD, JCS, other
services, the media and the public. These factors determine
Marine Corps roles and the resources allotted to accomplish
them. John Grace accurately described the external environ-
ment facing General Gray:
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Looking over an environment of changing international
relations, rapidly advancing technology, waning political
support and shrinking resources for military purposes,
shifting relationships within the Department of Defense and
the joint arena, and also within the Department of the Navy
of which the Marine Corps is part. General Gray's view of so
many variables over which he had little or no control must
have been one of great fluidity if not outright chaos.
(Grace, 1989, p. 30)
In summary, the external environment, where the Marine Corps
must operate in war and peace, is not stable and must be
accounted for in the service planning process. Obviously, the
Marine Corps does not operate in a vacuum and the external
environment plays a significant part in its strategy making
decisions and more importantly it is the essence for its
existence. However, we will not address each external
environmental factor, as many were addressed in earlier
chapters, and instead focus on the internal environment.
b. The Internal Environment
The Commandant is the swordsmith who must forge an
organization that can succeed on the chaotic battlefields of
the future and yet stay within the means of politically
allocated resources. The strategic factors within the Marine
Corps' internal environment are structure, culture and
resources. (Wheeler, Hunger, 1986) The overall structure or
"chain of command" for the Marine Corps consists of a clearly
defined divisional type structure, typical of military
organizations. However, the Commandant does have some
latitude to restructure/reorganize, and he recognized earlier
in his tenure that "If compatible with present and potential
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strategies, a corporation's structure is a great internal
strength." (Wheelen, Hunger, 1986, p. 133) Consequently, the
Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC) was
replaced by MCCDC and MCRDAC in November 1987 to improve the
acquisition process, meet the Goldwater-Nichols, and implement
the Packard Commission recommendations. According to General
Gray there were two major reasons for this change:
(1) A diffuse requirements determination process, involving
staffing amongst a number of different commands and
departments at Headquarters Marine Corps. This resulted in
lengthy program initiation and produced a bureaucratic
consensus, rather than a focused response to the needs of
the FMF Commanders.
(2) An absence of clearly defined lines of authority and
responsibility from one agency to another at the production
phase. (Tactical Systems Acquisition Manual, 1989, p. i)
Although this organizational overhaul was conceptualized
during former Commandant P.X. Kelley's tenure, it was General
Gray that carried it through. (Jones, 1987) Within six
months of taking office, General Gray took action to solve the
two problems listed above.
To improve this situation, I directed the establishment of
two major field commands from existing assets: The Marine
Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and the Marine
Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command
(MCRDAC) . MCCDC, activated on 10 November 1987, is the
Corps focal point for all studies, mission area analyses,
doctrine. Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) requirements
generation, training and education direction, and
warfighting conceptualization. MCRDAC, activated on 18
November 1987, is now the sole organization accountable for
all tactical systems acquisition. (USMC Tactical Systems
Acquisition Manual, 1989, p. i)
Essentially MCCDC is responsible to generate Fleet Marine
Force (FMF) requirements and prioritize available resources.
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MCRDAC is responsible to devise and execute acquisition
strategies. The roles of these two organizations in the
formulation process will be discussed later in this section.
The culture of an organization has a powerful
influence on an organizations ability to shift its strategic
direction. The organizational culture (beliefs, expectations
and values) of the Marine Corps is one of discipline,
commitment, obedience and pride, and represents one of the
Marine Corps' foremost attributes and internal strengths.
This internal strength makes the Marine Corps very unique and
extremely dynamic.
The resources include financial, physical and
manpower assets, as well as organizational systems and
technological capabilities. (Wheelen, Hunger, 1986) Each
category of resource can be an organizational strength or
weakness. Resources are the driving factors of the service
planning process because there are never enough of them.
However, we will not address each of the functional area of
resources because they are not directly within the short-term
control of the Marine Corps.
c. Identification of Strategic Issues
The identification of strategic issues—the
fundamental policy questions effecting the Marine Corps
missions, goals, objectives and strategies, is extremely
important because "an organization that does not respond to a
strategic issue can expect undesirable results from a threat,
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a missed opportunity, or both." (Bryson, 1988, p. 56) Many
of the strategic issues facing the Marine Corps were already
evident to the Commandant when he assumed that position. Many
more will be identified in his assessment of Marine Corps
performance and the external and internal environmental
factors. Additionally, the Commandant has strategic managers
or groupings which assist him in the entire strategic
management process. These are the people or groups of people
who assist the Commandant in scanning the external and
internal environment, and help formulate and implement goals,
objectives, strategies and policies.
Basically, there are six groups of strategic
players within the Marine Corps that influence service
strategy by assisting CMC in identifying, analyzing, and
evaluating solutions to strategic problems. The six groups of
strategic players are, also, the Corps' swordsmiths and their
input mechanisms to the Commandant form a "forge of ideas"
that can keep the organization healthy. The strategic groups
include the general officer corps, ACMC/HQMC Staff, MCCDC,
MCRDAC, Commanders and Marines, and the "Best and Brightest."
The delineation between the identification and
analysis of a strategic issue is easy to differentiate,
however the same mechanisms which identify the issues are many
times involved in analysis of those issues. Therefore in this
section we will only provide a brief overview of the strategic
groups involved in the strategic management process, with the
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understanding that many of the mechanisms to analyze strategic
issues are also mechanisms to identify strategic issues.
These mechanisms will be discussed in the analysis section.
(1) General Officer Corps . There are approxi-
mately 100 active duty and reserve general officers that
represent the corporate elite and have significant input to
not only strategy formulation, but must actually supervise its
implementation as well. General officers are not limited to
expressing their views only on issues regarding their
individually assigned responsibility. They can express their
views on all important issues facing the Corps.
(2) Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps
(ACMC) and Headcaiarters Marine Corps (HOMO Staff . HQMC is
located in the shared power, multi-goal political world of
Washington D.C. The HQMC staff assists the Commandant in
accomplishing his charter to prepare combat forces. The Chief
of Staff is responsible to direct, coordinate and supervise
HQMC staff activities. (HQMCORGMAN, 1989) Currently, the
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) , General J.J.
Went is also the Chief of Staff. The CMC-ACMC relationship
is best viewed as that between architect and foreman. The
Commandant philosophizes on the direction of the Corps and the
ACMC executes his vision. The ACMC Meetings handle issues
that go unresolved and bubble up from lower levels, it is also
a forum for senior leadership and feeds into the strategic
decision making process described later. The major
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participants are the Deputy Chiefs of Staff at HQMC, and if
appropriate or required, the force commanders and the
Commanding Generals of MCCDC and MCRDAC. The principles of
the HQMC staff, also, meet with the Commandant monthly and/or
as required. (Palm, 1989)
(3) Marine Corps Combat Development Command
(MCCDC) . MCCDC, "the proponents of the MAGTF," is responsible
for requirements definition of doctrine training/education and
structure/organization and is composed of five discrete, but
functionally related centers: Warfighting, Training and
Education, Wargaming and Assessment, Intelligence and
Information Technology. (Mullarkey, 1989)
(4) Marine Corps Research, Development and Accmi-
sition Command (MCRDAC) . MCRDAC is responsible for devising
and executing acquisition strategies for the procurement of
weapon systems and equipment or simply stated taking "a
validated requirement and turning it into reality, in the form
of warfighting weapon systems and equipment." (Tactical
Systems Acquisition Manual, 1989, p. 12)
(5) Field Commanders and Marines . The
Commandant, during his tenure, has made periodic visits to the
field. Roughly every six months he visits field commands to
talk with not only commanders, but their junior Marines as
well. These visits provide CMC with valuable input to
solutions of current problems, identify future problems and
concerns, and provide feedback on implementation problems.
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Also, quarterly FMF Commanders visit CMC and HQMC to discuss
the latest issues.
(6) The "Best and Brightest" . The best and
brightest is essentially anyone in the Marine Corps who
possesses a specialized talent or expertise that can be
focused within the Commandant's vision. The Commandant
assigns these individuals to perform ad hoc studies, meet on
temporary committees or attend spot conferences. This best
and brightest technique ideally represents his mission
oriented leadership philosophy and his desire to "use anyone
and everyone to provide a solution" to problems facing the
Marine Corps. (Converse, 1989) This best and brightest
technique is best exemplified by one-man studies or
specialized conferences assigned by or attended by General
Gray.
(7) Summary . This section covered the second
step in the formulation phase of the service planning process.
This step involves the assessment of the overall environment
and the identification of strategic issues. While the
Commandant is the foremost player in the strategy making
process, he is also assisted by the six strategic groups,
which are actively involved in the service planning process.
The interactions of the Commandant and these six strategic
groups, for the most part, will determine the strategic
management style of the organization. In the next section, we
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will discuss the analysis of the strategic issues and how the
Commandant and these six strategy groups interact.
3 . Coordination and Analysis of Strategic Issues
Although the Marine Corps has no systematic process to
review internal and external environments in their entirety,
there are some systematic, very detailed studies done on
components of the environment. The Commandant, from his
position at the apex of the organization, and as a member of
JCS , is in the best position to perceive and analyze the
external environment and internal organization in their
entirety. General Gray's remarks made before the Senate Armed
Services Committee on 16 March 1988 reflect his appreciation
for this type of evaluation and analysis prior to deciding on
which direction to lead the organization.
It is my view that it's more important than ever to take a
hard look at ourselves, at the military forces that we have
today, and the capabilities that are inherent therein. We
need to examine where we must go in the future. There have
been gradual changes in the international security
environment and less gradual changes in the impact of
domestic issues on defense policy. We need to recognize
them. We need to focus on what's best for the country.
(Gray, 1988, p. 10)
The coordination and analysis of the strategic issues will be
discussed from the context of the six strategic groupings
identified earlier. It should be remembered that although we
are discussing the strategic groups separately they are highly
interactive and integrated. Also, as indicated previously,
the mechanisms discussed in this section can also serve as
identification mechanisms.
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a. General Officer Corps
Due to their status and vast experience in matters
concerning the Marine Corps, the general officer corps
represents a significant resource strength. The Commandant
recognizes the value of the general officer corps and uses and
relies on their talents extensively. While the Commandant
will always listen to good ideas, he also has formal
mechanisms for the analysis (and identification) of strategic
issues. Some of these mechanisms will be discussed below.
(1) General Officer Symposiums . CMC schedules a
General Officer's Symposium approximately every six months to
discuss strategic issues or in Marine Corps terms a
"collection of concerns." The process is relatively the same
each time, but is flexible depending on the Commandant's
preferences. A message schedules the symposium and requests
input for the agenda or topics for discussion from the field.
FMF and non-FMF units respond with outstanding problems that
are consolidated and bulletized by CMC's Special Projects
Directorate. Short briefings are given on each topic, which
are followed by a general discussion. A less formalized
method has also been conducted featuring a round table
discussion without the aide of an agenda. CMC summarizes the
symposium and posts an after-action report to all attendees.
The symposium is an opportunity for CMC and his generals to
hear differing points of view and get a feel for the group
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consensus on all the major issues the Marine Corps will face
and CMC will decide on in the future. (Converse, 1989)
General Gray held a symposium on December 1-
3, 1987 that was attended by 50 senior officers. Each morning
was devoted to the wargaming of a potential global crisis and
the afternoons to the discussion of a variety of topics
selected by the Commandant. The following strategic topics
were discussed:
MAGTF force structure, to include priorities and how the
Corps should shape itself in face of probable commitments
and mounting fiscal constraints.
Increased focus on warfighting and operational thinking
and techniques/programs to achieve these goals.
Reorganizations—MCCDC and MCRDAC.
Standardization throughout the FMF.
The future of the Corps and the importance of its
"expeditionary" nature. (M.C. Gazette, January 1988, p.
8)
Another symposium was held from May 1-5, 1989
for 94 active and reserve general officers and executive
service personnel. The first part of the week was spent
evaluating a global wargame. The wargaming seminar allowed
the participants to discuss national strategy issues, the
Marine Corps' role in national strategy, and the employment of
Marine Corps forces in global scenarios. The balance of the
week was devoted to issues now confronting the Corps such as:
The Marine Corps role in drug interdiction efforts,
including briefings from the Drug Enforcement Agency, the
Department of State, the Customs Service, and the Coast
Guard. The session was led by LtGen Stephen G. Olmstead
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(USMC) , Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug
Enforcement.
Status reports from the Commanding Generals of Fleet
Marine Force, Atlantic and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
Marine Corps family support matters, family advocacy,
child care, housing, and medical care.
Operational tempo and its impact on the Corps.
MV-22 Osprey program.
Selected review of Marine Corps research and development
program.
Review of officer force management structure.
Updates on warfighting enhancements. (M.C. Gazette, July
1989, p. 4)
Also, other types of symposiums are held that
concentrate on a certain area such as the Assault Support
Symposium held on January 23-27, 1989. The theme was "Marine
Aviation—The Year 2000 and Beyond" and involved senior
aviation leaders from HQMC, MCCDC, MCRDAC and the FMF. The
symposium discussed significant aviation issues, the draft
MAGTF Master Plan, which included discussion of equipment,
training, tactics and doctrinal priorities, and the new Marine
attack and observation aircraft concept under development.
Symposium recommendations will become potential input into
formal planning and programming processes via the MMP and POM.
An after-action report analyzing the symposium's highlights
and recommendations will be distributed to major FMF commands
(active and reserve) . That report will become an input to the
Program Objective Memorandum process, doctrine development,
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and training plans for the entire assault support community.
(M.C. Gazette, March 1989, p. 4)
(2) General Officer Warqaming Seminars . Wargam-
ing seminars, for the general officer corps, are held
periodically throughout the year and are separate from those
held concurrently with the symposiums. Four wargaming
seminars have been held since General Gray directed the
creation of MCCDC and its Wargaming and Assessment Center.
Thirty generals participated in Policy and Wargame IV, held
from October 10-12, 1989. According to the director of the
Center, "General A.M. Gray, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, wants his general officers to participate in these type
of wargames, which allow them to polish their skills in
strategy formulation and campaign planning." (Ruby, 1989, p.
1) Wargaming is not new for the Marine Corps, but a wargaming
seminar devoted to experiencing general officers to
warfighting, intelligence, logistics and politics at the
National Security Council, regional theatre command and joint
task force levels is. In an era of budget constraints,
wargaming is not only an inexpensive way to train, but may be
the only way to simulate situations that can bring critical
issues to light.
b. Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC)
and Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) Staff
The Assistant Commandant, who acts as Chief of
Staff, holds an ACMC Committee Meeting at HQMC, as required.
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General officers, serving as heads of the staff functional
areas, discuss roles of the Marine Corps as they pertain to
their responsibilities. The ACMC Committee influences CMC
decisions as follows:
"Blesses" POM before CMC review.
Reviews contentious issues and makes recommendations to
CMC.
- Final advising body on all "big ticket" issues.
Provides recommendations to CMC on execution issues
that could lead to modification of service strategy.
(Palm, 1989)
This group can quickly provide the Commandant with the latest
concerns in the turbulent, political environment HQMC operates
in.
c. Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC)
MCCDC was designed to increase the Marine Corps
"efficiency in training, education, planning, material
requirements identification, and concept and doctrinal
development." (Gray, 1987, p. 2) As previously discussed,
the organization was established by General Gray from
components of the former MCDEC and consists of five centers
—
MAGTF Warfighting Center, Training and Education Center,
Intelligence Center, Wargaming and Assessment Center, and
Information Technology Center. As depicted in Figure 3-2,
MCCDC is the centerpiece of the Marine Corps organization.
Its mission is to develop and assess concepts, prepare plans,
determine material requirements and manage the training and
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•MAGTF-MEU (SOC), MEB, MEF MEF, MEB, MEU (SOC) - MAGTFs-
Figure 3-2 Marine Corps Organizational Changes
(Grace, 1989, p. 30)
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education of the Marine Corps. (Grace, 1989) The roles and
functions of each of the centers within MCCDC will be
discussed below.
(1) MAGTF Warfiahting Center . The MAGTF
Warfighting Center is responsible for the development of
operating concepts and doctrine, improve the Marine Corps
analysis of force structure and material requirements and
enhance doctrinal coordination with other Services and Allies.
It is also responsible to coordinate and generate the mid- and
long-range plans for the Marine Corps with the active
participation of HQMC and the FMF. During formulation, service
strategy concepts are analyzed for strengths and deficiencies.
Deficiencies in the current force are identified through
mission area analysis and feedback from the field.
Alternatives are analyzed, then decisions and strategies are
integrated, as appropriate, into the formal detailed plans of
the CBRS . The Commandant has final approval on the
Warfighting Center's recommendations before they are
incorporated into the planning documents.
(2) Training and Education Center . The Training
and Education Center oversees the challenges to improving
training and professional military education (PME) within the
Marine Corps. Many of the Commandant's initiatives and
changes such as warrior training, PME reading program and the
Marine Corps University will be monitored by this Center.
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(3) Waraaminq and Assessment Center . This center
will provide the means to assess concepts and doctrine and
assist in the training of present and future commanders and
staffs.
It is essential that the Marine Corps have state-of-the-art
wargaming capability that allows us to assess the
effectiveness of doctrine and hardware in countering the
threat spectrum. Such a center will help produce quick-
thinking operationally responsible commanders and staff
officers; and through modeling and simulation, it will
provide the Marine Corps the advantage and opportunity of
exercising new operational ideas to counter known and
anticipated threats. The Wargaming and Assessment Center
will be a vital link in the production of sound doctrine for
our Marines in the coming years, and it will provide
valuable service to the Fleet Marine Forces and to our
professional schools. (Gray, 1987, p. 4)
Semiannual general officer wargaming, discussed earlier, is
not the only responsibility of the Wargaming and Assessment
Center. Besides coordinating and developing wargames for
other Marine Corps schools and training centers, the Center is
also tasked to provide modeling and assessment for the
Warfighting Center. Alternative structure, doctrine, training
and equipment changes contemplated and analyzed by the
Warfighting Center are modeled and further assessed by the
Wargaming and Modeling Center. Modeling identifies other
potential and related problems the alternative created and
therefore allows for a thorough analysis. Senior decision
makers and long-range planners observe and evaluate the
alternative modeling efforts in a learning process. Critiques
of wargames or modeling efforts can provide new innovative
solutions, or give rise to new strategic issues and problems.
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These new variables are then added to the wargame in a
learning process that gives the planners a better appreciation
of the full scope of the problem, as they search for a better
alternative. (Ponnwitz, 1989)
(4) Intelligence Center . The Intelligence
Center's primary responsibilities are to conduct threat
analysis, promote intelligence awareness and provide
intelligence support.
Solid, reliable threat analysis lends itself to on-target
material requirement profiles, appropriate training and
education, sound concepts on which to base our doctrine, and
optimal short- and long-term operational planning. For
these reasons, the location of a capable, resourceful
intelligence agency at Quantico is vital to the
effectiveness of MCCDC. This center must and will work
hand-in-glove with other centers providing information on
which to base concepts, plans and doctrine. (Gray, 1987,
p. 4)
The Intelligence Center will enhance environmental assessment
capabilities in the most likely conflict areas: expeditionary
operations and small wars. The focus of the center will be
on "forecasting the threat environment for low intensity and
unconventional warfare and in drawing on existing intelligence
assets and tailoring them to specific Marine Corps needs."
(MC Gazette, March 1989, p. 6) But it will also analyze
resources and missions and make recommendations on structure,
training, doctrine and equipment changes. The Center will not
duplicate existing intelligence capabilities, but will plug a
crucial gap. General Gray plans for the center to become "a
model of all source, fused and tailored intelligence...
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interacting with the FMF and HQMC." (MC Gazette, March 1989,
p. 6) The Marine Corps Intelligence Center is not only a
strategic creation, but will greatly assist in the strategic
management process in the future by relating the operational
environment to the organizational environment through
recommended force development changes and by closely
coordinating headquarters end field concerns.
(5) Information Technolocrv Center . The Informa-
tion Technology Center will provide the requisite information
and networking systems, within and between MCCDC, HQMC,
operational forces and the supporting establishment.
We are all aware of the pressing need for rapid transfer of
information. To fail in this area is an admission of
inefficiency at best and a loss of control at worst. We
must institute measures through our Information Technology
Center to ensure any shortcoming in this area is avoided.
(Gray, 1987, p. 4)
MCCDC and its five Centers are the key to the
service planning process and with its most important function
is to act as the sponsor for the MAGTF's.
This is where the ideas, plans and resources are brought
together to insure that Marine Air-Ground Task Forces are,
in fact, the fully integrated fighting systems that CMC
represents them to be to the NCA and the Unified
Commanders. (Grace, 1989, p. 31)
d. Marine Corps Research Development and Acquisition
Command (MCRDAC)
MCRDAC is responsible and accountable for all
equipment acquisition matters and, therefore evaluates and
implements all equipment and material changes.
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The Commandant decided on the need for a command that would
have nearly complete responsibility for satisfying the
tactical equipment needs of the Corps as expressed by
(MCCDC) . . . .The clear cut intention is to speed up and
streamline the acquisition process. .. .Requirements will be
determined at MCCDC and passed to MCRDAC for speedy and
economic satisfaction and for delivery to the user... the
fundamental reason for MCRDAC is to guarantee that the Fleet
Marine Force Marines are equipped with the means of combat
that contribute to victory. (Winglass, 1988, p. 12)
e. Conferences and Visits with Field Commanders and
Marines
Some of the most valuable input CMC receives is
during visits to field commands. These Commanders'
Conferences provide crucial feedback on not only
implementation problems of current strategy, but on new
opportunities and threats that can be acted upon. General
Gray held an "FMF Commanders' Round Table" at Camp Pendleton
for 20 senior FMF Commanders from August 9-11, 1989. The
purpose of the meeting was to exchange ideas on important
issues and developments. The following crucial topics were on
the agenda:
The Marine Corps as a national force in readiness in a
changing international environment.
Improving MAGTF closure times.
Future requirements for maritime pre-positioning forces.
Smart extended range munitions.
Combat service support structure, capabilities, and
manpower reductions.
- Development of armor and antiarmor concepts.
Over the horizon operations without the MV-22.
End strength reductions.
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Comparison of the air defense variant of the Light





Deployment constraints on women Marines and single
parents.
Passenger restrictions for medium and heavy helicopters.
Staffing of remotely piloted vehicle companies.
Reorganization of light armored infantry units. (M.C.
Gazette, September 1989, p. 4)
During General Gray's visits, commanders are not his only
interest. He has been known to make unannounced visits, and
bypass the chain of command to talk to Marines to get a feel
for what is actually going on.
He seems more comfortable talking to colonels than generals.
He flies down to Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point,
arrives unannounced and roams all over the base for six
hours before the Commanding General even knows he's there.
(Gold, 1989, p. 9)
This is to emphasize that General Gray listens to everyone;
not just his generals.
He still is a contact man. His aides know there is no such
thing as a straight line when Gray goes from point A to
point B. If there is a Marine between. Gray swerves for a
talk, often punctuated with body punches .... Such physical
communication may appall board room directors, but Marines
revel in it. It's like being patted on the back by Dad,
Marines say. (Jones, 1988, p. 16)
General Gray has opened up the lines of communication with his
leadership style and has been well received within the ranks.
General Gray has emphasized the importance he
places on getting ideas and suggestions from all Marines. He
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has sought ideas and innovation from the lowest echelon by
encouraging Marines to "turn the brain power on." "The one
message I want relayed to all Marines—active, reserve, and
retired and all friends of Marines— is turn on the brain power
and help make your Corps what you want it to be." (Gray, 1988,
p. 17) "Gray has said hundreds of times that he wants
thinking Marines and ideas expressed 'from the bottom up. ' He
has also said that he believes young troops should be
recognized more than they are." (Jones, April 18, 1988, p. 5)
He has rewarded those who do. With much publicity, he
personally awarded PFC Neil Wadley with a Navy Achievement
Medal for his innovative suggestion to use an inverted forest
firefighters' thermal protective blanket in order to reduce
the heat signature of modern electronics equipment. (Jones,
April 1988, p. 5)
f. "Best and Brightest" Technique
CMC will choose quality people to take a general
idea and develop it fully into something that can benefit the
organization. A one-man study, usually lasting approximately
60 days, will be initiated and fully supported by the
Commandant himself. CMC will give broad mission type guidance
and then provide "overwatch" for the study. CMC believes
committees are killers! The individual, who is totally
accountable for his/her efforts, will collect information,
examine it and brief a recommendation directly with the
Commandant. The individual is normally given complete
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freedom, has no additional duties and is able to cross command
and staff boundaries. The individual must present a consensus
that can be implemented in all force units, overseas and on
both coasts. The study, once briefed, is routed to commanders
and staff that will have to implement the recommendations.
CMC's decision is based on the studies' recommendations and
input from the formal command structure. The accDuntable
individual will usually be tasked with overseeing the
implementation of the idea he or she championed. (Kopca,
Converse, 1989) This process according to General Gray:
We recognized a window of opportunity that would allow us to
make necessary change—but we had to act quickly. We looked
at the lessons learned in previous studies, concepts and
reports and revisited techniques that had served us well in
the past. We then assembled some of our best and brightest
officers and charged them with identifying the changes
needed to make the Corps better.
Herein lay our formula for success in institutionalizing
change. Our junior leadership generated ideas and
identified the basic means to implement them; our senior
leadership validated these ideas. Together we committed
ourselves to accomplishing them while staying within current
resource limits. We avoided the lengthy, bureaucratic
staffing process that can so often stifle or kill a
worthwhile concept. (Gray, 1989, p. 21)
This technique was used in recent force structure changes, the
creation of MCCDC/MCRDAC , and the writing of FMFM 1, all of
which proceeded in a rapid manner. More will be said about
these examples later in this chapter.
In a similar fashion, the Commandant will gather
a talented group of individuals together at a conference and
challenge them to solve problems they have first hand
knowledge of. For instance, the Artillery Conference, August
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14-18, 1989, brought together specialists in artillery from
around the Marine Corps. General Gray challenged them with
the question, "What should Marine Corps artillery look like in
the future?" (Converse, 1989) Some of the changes
recommended by artillery's best and brightest were as follows:
That HQMC, MCCDC, and MCRDAC aggressively pursue the
development and acquisition of new equipment in POM 92-
97. A lightweight 155mm towed howitzer and the Multiple
Launch Rocket System (MLRS) to replace, respectively, the
mobile, but ancient 105mm howitzer and very heavy self-
propelled guns was recommended.
That MCCDC develop an organizational structure to support
the fielding of lightweight 155mm howitzer battalions and
MLRS batteries. A proposed force structure for the
interim and desired period, that fits into the current
direct and general support artillery doctrine, was also
recommended. (ACMC memo 5050/ACMC:67 dated September 7,
1989)
Following input and approval from ACMC and the Commanding
General of MCCDC, the Commandant moved to have these
recommendations implemented quickly. Although the Commandant
is not adverse to risk, he tempers his decisions with
judgment, and other decisions, such as a recommendation to
keep trained lieutenants in the artillery units longer, was
held in abeyance until the recommended solution was validated
and reviewed by appropriate staff and by the formal channels
of the organization. Upon completion of this review the
recommendation was not implemented due to other constraints
surfaced in the review process.
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4 . Strategic Evaluation and Selection
Once the strategic issues are identified and analyzed,
the courses of action or alternatives must be evaluated and
finally the best strategy selected for implementation. The
Commandant decides from the alternatives presented, after
considering all applicable external and internal environmental
factors. While it is impossible to actually view the
Commandant's thought processes, there are basic considerations
in the strategic decision making process.
An effective strategy must meet several criteria. It must
be technically workable, politically acceptable to
stakeholders, and must accord with the organization's
philosophy and core values. It should be ethical, moral,
and legal. It must also deal with the strategic issue it
was suppose to address. (Bryson, 1988, p. 60)
Choosing among a set of strategically acceptable courses of
action is often extremely difficult. All strategic choices
will involve organizational conflict, as each alternative will
have its proponents and critics.
Regardless of the quantifiable pros and cons of each
alternative, the actual decision will probably be influenced
by a number of subjective factors that are difficult to
quantify. Some of these factors are management's attitude
towards risk, pressures from the external environment,
influences of the corporate culture, and the personal needs
and desires of key managers. (Wheelen, Hunger, 1987, p.
193)
Much of General Gray's decision would logically be based on
his vision of the future, input from the strategic groups, his
sense of the political environment, and his years of
experience. It probably would be a safe bet to assume that
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all things being equal, a course of action which reinforces
his warfighting philosophy would be chosen.
D. IMPLEMENTATION MODES: TEMPERING THE SWORD
Like strategic management, the aim of the service planning
process is to formulate superior strategies and implement them
efficiently and effectively. As previously indicated,
although formulation and implementation are "intertwined as
complex interactive processes in which politics, values,
organizational culture, and management styles determine or
constrain particular strategic decisions," for the purpose of
description we have separated the service planning process
into these two parts. (Quinn, et al., 1988, p. XXII) The
implementation aspect of the service planning process is
important to examine because once the strategy has been
formulated, it is only through implementation that the desired
results can actually be achieved. The implementation of
strategies often posses a greater management challenge than
the formulation of that strategy and the importance of
implementation cannot be understated. This can best be summed
up by Richard G. Hanemesh. "Just being able to conceive bold
new strategies is not enough. The general manager must also
be able to translate his or her strategic vision into concrete
steps that 'get things done'." (Strickland, Thompson, 1984,
p. 195)
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Once the strategies are formulated, they must be
implemented through the strategic management process. For the
Marine Corps, strategy implementation can occur through what
we will call the formal mode, the informal mode or the
interactive mode. The formal mode is the formal systematic
planning process which is organized and developed on the basis
of a set of procedures. It is through the formal mode that
the strategic plans, long-range plans, and short-range budgets
and operating plans are linked together. However, strategic
planning is not just necessarily concerned with matters which
are long range. Additionally, short-term strategic matters
can arise from sudden or unpredictable changes in the
environment of the organization. (Radford, 1980) Further-
more, top-level management, the Commandant for the Marine
Corps, may desire immediate implementation or see the need,
for what ever reason, to circumvent the formal process in
order to achieve the results more quickly. Just as a
swordsmith would temper different metals at various rates to
achieve the ideal blend of hardness and elasticity in his
sword. The immediate implementation of a change would occur
through the informal mode. It should be noted that although
the formal and informal modes can involve conflict with each
other, these modes are intertwined and should be complementary
to each other. The strategic management accomplished through
the formal mode guides the decisions made today, in turn the
decisions made today shape the future. In "real life" most
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strategies are implemented through the interactive mode
—
combination or coupling of the formal and informal modes.
The implementation of the Marine Corps service strategies
is a complicated, iterative, and interwoven process. Many
factors and characteristics of the organization, such as
organizational structure, organization size, style of
leadership, and the overall environment can greatly influence
the implementation process, but the goal of implementation
will remain the same, that is, achieving the desired results,
getting it done. As indicated by the model, the product of
implementation is the results or performance which must be
evaluated and controlled. Obtaining the desired results, once
the strategy has been formulated, will require going through
the formal, informal or interactive modes. These modes will
be discussed in greater detail in the following sections.
Since taking office on 1 July 1987 as the Commandant of
the Marine Corps, General Gray has initiated numerous
significant and far-reaching changes throughout the Marine
Corps. These changes covered the entire spectrum of the
Marine Corps including structure, training, facilities,
doctrine and acquisition/material. Just the number, the
degree of importance and the rate at which most of General
Gray's initiatives were or are being implemented could be
considered strategic, however, this paper will only focus on
some of the changes representative of General Gray's
implementation style. Additionally, to assist in the
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description and subsequent analysis of the implementation of
these changes, they will be discussed in the context of the
model
.
1. The Formal Mode
Prior to the pressures to reform the Marine Corps
service planning process, which were discussed in Chapter II,
the guidance and responsibilities for the formal mode of the
Marine Corps service planning were published in the Marine
Corps Manual (dated May 19, 1980 w/rev) and the Marine Corps
Planning and Programming Manual (HQO P3121.E dated March 5,
1984). At that time, the service planning process entailed
the development of the: 1) Marine Corps Long-Range Plan
(MLRP) , which provided broad concepts, planning objectives,
and served as a basis for the evolutionary development of the
Marine Corps for the period 10-2 years in the future; 2) the
Marine Corps Mid-Range Objectives Plan (MMROP) , which provided
guidance and outlined concepts, requirements and objectives
for statutory missions in support of national strategy for the
next ten years; and 3) the Marine Corps Mobilization
Management Plan (MPLAN) , which established the policies,
procedures and responsibilities for the mobilization of the
Marine Corps. While the planning structure seemed plausible,
it lacked substance. The MLRP was "produced by field grade
officers without substantial input from CMC. . .consequently,
although the MLRP is signed by the CMC, it is not perceived as
his plan." (CNA Study, 1984, p. 7) As noted in Chapter II,
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long-range planning for the Marine Corps had become a
bureaucratic exercise and exerted little impact on the
decision making process. It failed to provide the necessary
guidance and direction for the actions being taken because it
lacked the key ingredient to make it strategic—active
participation of the top-level management.
Recently, under General Gray, the Marine Corps adopted
a new formal service planning methodology based on a Concept-
Based Requirements System (CBRS) , which "includes concept
development to explore, evaluate, and critique ideas; plans to
guide and document the need for change; and alternate
solutions to maintain combat-ready forces." (Ponnwitz, 1988,
p. 1) The major service planning documents of the newly
initiated CBRS encompass: 1) the Marine Corps Campaign Plan
(MCCP) which outlines the Commandant's guidance; 2) the
Umbrella Concept which projects the future environment,
characteristics, challenges, and capabilities of the Marine
Corps; 3) the Marine Corps Long-Range Plan (MLRP) which
provides broad, forward-looking guidance; and 4) the Marine
Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Master Plan (MMP) which
establishes the operational foundation for MAGTF planning.
The formal mode of the implementation phase follows the
structured route of the CBRS planning document cycle. It
begins in the formulation phase with the publication of the
MCCP followed by the Umbrella Concept, MLRP, and MMP and MMP
supporting plans. At this point the formal mode of the
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implementation phase begins. The MMP and supporting planning
documents provide the basic input for the programmers.
Finally the program decisions and objectives are
transcended into the POM cycle of the budget formulation
process which attempts to arrive at the most effective and
efficient allocation of resources to accomplish our national
defense objectives. The POM is fiscally constrained and
contains information on the Marine Corps programs planned for
a six year period. It covers the objectives, planned
activities, and costs of all programs. The end result is the
allocation and allotment of resources. The limitations placed
on the resources is the driving factor of the formal
structured service planning process. For if resources were
unlimited, there would be a significantly less and possibly no
need for such a formal planning process. However, lifting the
restrictions placed on an organization by limited resources
would not alleviate the need for strategic management.
2. The Informal Mode
The initiation of the structured CBRS service planning
system, as discussed in the previous section, is by no means
the extent of the new directions implemented by General Gray.
For any Commandant, especially General Gray with his "get it
done" attitude, the formal mode is not the most desireable
implementation mode. It is General Gray's style to make
maximum use of the informal side of the implementation model.
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...Gray's personal style, which has never been noted for
either formality or leisurely attention to administrative
detail. A retired colonel who works in Marine Corps affairs
criticizes him sharply for bypassing the chain of command
and normal procedures when he wants something done (which is
nearly all the time). (Gold, 1989, p. 9)
Most managers would like to see their strategies implemented
as quickly as possible so the benefits of the results could be
realized. If it were not for the limited resources, many more
initiatives would follow the informal mode in the implementa-
tion model. The best case scenario for the informal mode
would allow changes to be implemented in an expedious manner
with no or little requirement for resources. However, the
reality is that resources are limited and many new directions
and organizational changes must be phased in or implemented
over a series of years, amd therefore will require
implementation through a combination of the formal and
informal modes. At a minimum the two modes would require
interaction and adjustments. Even General Gray acknowledges
"that all the goals I envisioned will not be accomplished on
my watch," (Gray, January 1988, p. 175) but the planting of
the strategy seed for future growth (implementation) can be
strategic in itself, that is to say, the choice of the
implementation mode can be critical.
In the most strict sense, the informal mode of Service
Planning Process Model presented earlier entails the direct
implementation of the strategy with no required formal
structured planning or the reallocation of previously
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designated resources from the formal process. It will be at
the resource block in the model that much of the interaction
between the formal and informal modes will occur. Resources
would include all the assets of the Marine Corps
—
personnel,
funding and physical assets. In "real life" the "absolute"
use of the informal mode would seldom happen, for some type of
resources would be required. Albeit some initiatives can be
implemented or at least began with very little or
insignificant amounts of resources. An example of an
initiative implemented through the absolute informal mode
would be the Marine Corps Professional Reading Program as
published in All Marine (ALMAR) 127/89. The Professional
Reading Program is part of an overall education package to
develop "thinking leaders" and was institutionalize at a
inconsequential amount of resources. The ALMAR requires that
Marines in the rank of corporal or above read a certain number
of prescribed books per year. At little or minimal cost the
Professional Reading Program will instill a sense of Marine
values and traits, and impart some of the Commandant's
philosophy and desired organizational behavior. In the words
of General Gray: "I firmly believe that professional reading
is essential to the professional growth of our leaders.
Marines fight better when they fight smarter. Systematic and
progressive reading contributes directly to that goal." (ALMAR
127/89) The aim of the reading program according to the ALMAR
is to provide a continuum of study for all Marine leaders.
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Additionally, it is designed to: 1) impart a sense of Marine
values and traits; 2) increase professional military
knowledge; 3) improve analytical and reasoning skills; 4)
increase capability for using printed media as a means of
learning and communicating; 5) increase knowledge of our
nation's institutions and principles upon which our government
and our way of life are founded; and 6) increase knowledge of
the world's governments, cultures and geography.
The publication of the Fleet Marine Force Manual 1;
Warfiahting would be another example of General Gray
promulgating his philosophy through the informal mode. Using
his best and brightest technique, this book was written by
Captain John Schmitt, who had experience writing a previous
manual. According to Captain Schmitt, who spent two four-hour
sessions with the Commandant, "He (CMC) didn't give me
specific instructions. The sources and the organization and
the stumbling were my own." (Gold, 1989, p. 16) The 88-page
manual provides General Gray's philosophy on warfighting—the
how Marines will prepare to fight and the how Marines will
fight. It's a manual that "describes a style of fighting and
an approach to duty and a way of life." (Gold, 1989, p. 16)
The manual furthers General Gray's goal to get every Marine to
"fight smarter" by becoming "better thinkers." Individual
copies of the publication were mailed to each officer in the
Marine Corps with the message to "read—and reread—this book,
understand it, and take its message to heart." (FMFM 1:
91
Warfighting, 1989, p. 1) The manual promotes and more
importantly declares that "maneuver warfare" is the Marine
Corps' official philosophy. To ensure his warfighting
philosophy was understood throughout the Marine Corps, a
special team of officers traveled to various Marine Corps
bases to expound on the manual. "It has also been the star
attraction of a traveling road show, featuring a team from
Quantico that goes to various bases, locks up enough officers
to fill a messhall and gives them two hours to read the book
prior to a discussion session." (Gold, 1989, p. 15)
In addition to FMFM 1, each officer received a copy of
the Commandant's Report to the Officers Corps. The report was
intended to assist officers in understanding what the
Commandant's vision of the future held for the Marine Corps.
The report contained a variety of issues resolved during the
General Gray's tenure or were being in the process of being
staffed for resolution in the future. The report listed the
issues in three general categories: 1) How the Marine Corps
will train and fight; 2) the Marine Corps' role in supporting
national security; and 3) How the Marines view themselves.
The above-mentioned cases of initiatives implemented,
in essence, through the informal mode are certainly not all
General Gray's initiatives, but are reflective of how he is
attempting to institutionalize an attitude, and a way of life
and thought process for the Marine Corps.
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3 . The Interactive Mode
Unfortunately the implementation of most service
strategies cannot be immediately emplaced. Therefore, many of
the strategies will be implemented through the interactive
mode. In addition to the resource limitations, it can be a
slow and suffering process for organizations to learn new
ideas and make appropriate changes because of the many
interacting factors affecting an organization's capability to
implement new strategies. An innovated and aggressive leader
craving to implement his strategies quickly is in conflict
with the slow bureaucratic machine. The various barriers and
factors resisting change, coupled with the real life
constraints imposed by limited resources, will require many
strategies to be implemented through a combination of the
formal and informal mode. Additionally, the forces of the
machine bureaucracy will be pushing the initiatives of the
informal mode back into the formal mode at the earliest
possible time, while the aggressive leader will be exerting
his efforts to stay in the informal mode and only enter the
formal mode when required, preferably at the "result" end of
the model. For General Gray, his "get it done" attitude and
trait to "make things happen" is prevalent throughout the
spectrum of implementation. This is not to say the aggressive
leader neglects or does not realize the importance of a formal
structured planning process.
93
To instill the warrior philosophy in the Marine Corps
and achieve his goal to "ensure every Marine is a warrior
first" (Jordan, 1988, p. 28), in addition to develop "thinking
leaders," General Gray has brought about many significant
changes through the interactive mode. This does not mean that
all these changes were excessively delayed due to the
interactions of the modes but it required tradeoffs,
adjustments and complimentary actions between the modes to
accomplish the objectives. In actuality, many of the changes
were enacted extremely quickly. After all, one cannot not
forget General Gray's leadership style. "He doesn't micro-
manage. He finds people who are savvy, gives them direction
and turns them loose. And implicit in the quotation's tone is
the Gray philosophy
—
get it done. He often adds, 'Or I will
find someone who will'." (Jones, 1989, p. 16)
An example reflective of the Commandant's style was
his reshaping of the Marine Corps training and education
programs. It began with the reorganization of the Marine
Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC) located in
Quant ico, Virginia. Although a major undertaking, on the
212th birthday of the Marine Corps—November 10, 1987, less
than five months after assuming office. General Gray approved
the reorganization of MCDEC and established the Marine Corps
Combat Development Command (MCCDC) , "a name more accurately
reflecting its new roles." (Gray, 1987, p. 7) At the heart
of the reorganization were the five centers within MCCDC.
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These included the Warfighting Center, the Training and
Education Center, the Intelligence Center, Wargaming and
Assessment Center, and the Information Technology Center.
Many more changes falling under the purview of these Centers
were to follow, but we will concentrate on the Training and
Education Center.
After the reorganization was completed the Commandant
wanted to maintain the momentum for institutionalizing his
training and education initiatives. In a letter to the
Commanding General of MCCDC, General Gray provided further
guidance.
The full establishment of Quantico of an Marine Air-Ground
Training and Education Center last fall marked the
completion of the Center's reorganization and relocation
ef forts. .. .We are off and running
—
you and the members of
your command have made significant progress and—we have
momentum! Now let's make it happen and institutionalize as
we implement! (CMC Letter, July 1, 1989)
The five page letter provided his intent and conceptualized
his vision of Marine Corps training and education process of
the future. Additionally he provided areas to be examined/
validated and provided philosophical direction for Marine
Corps schools. The letter ended with "Don't staff or examine
these issues to death; let's get on with it
—
you have the
Charter. .. .Use the philosophy expressed in FMFM 1:
Warfighting!" (CMC Letter, July 1, 1989)
On the education side of the house, a comprehensive
new program of continuing Professional Military Education
(PME) is being institutionalized. In "order to successfully
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implement and manage the new PME program" (ALMAR 128/89)
,
General Gray activated, within the Training and Education
Center of MCCDC, a Marine Corps University and assigned a
General Officer as its president.
On the training side of the house, the Commandant is
committed to reshaping how the Marine Corps trains for war.
In terms of commitment, "warrior training is riding ligh on
commitment." (Jones, 1988, p. 16) General Gray "believes in
the importance of warrior training and that it's time to get
back to the basics." (Bout, 1988, p. 42) The Marine Corps
warrior training concept effects all Marines and is wide-
ranging. It begins with the Marine Battle Skills Training
(MBST) Program and extends through the structure of the Marine
Corps. In General Gray's report to the officer corps he said,
"MBST is a vital warfighting initiative, an investment in the
individual Marine and the single most important training
program in the Marine Corps today." (CMC Letter, July 1,
1989) The MBST consists of the: 1) Basic Warrior Training
(BWT) conducted at the recruit depots; 2) Marine Combat
Training (MCT) , a 28-day training package at the Schools of
Infantry; 3) Marines Leaders Training (MLT) which encompass
the NCO schools and staff NCO academies; and 4) Unit
Sustainment Training (UST) . Additionally, new enhanced
infantry training, marksmanship, close combat, physical
fitness and water survival training is being
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institutionalized. The implementation of these programs are
not without costs both in manpower and funds.
One of Gray's chores will be sustaining that momentum,
particularly in the near future when commitment to demanding
technical skills butts head-on into the equally time-
consuming dedication to warriorism. There may not be enough
hours in the day to keep both on front burners. .. .Already,
however, questions have surfaced. Some are asking, "Can the
Marine Corps afford it?"—it being the cost in terms of
people, money and commitment. . . .Of all commands the MCRDs
are the furthest along in Basic Warrior Training. Gray gave
them a short fuse, which has exploded into reality. Boot
camps had to incorporate about 60 hours of BWT into training
cycles that were not increased beyond the normal 57 days.
The impact was another 5 1/2 days of instruction jammed into
the same schedule. "We were finishing lesson plans the day
before the first platoons were to do it (in January). And
our support people worked around the clock to put the extra
facilities in. "....He needs more manpower, but isn't likely
to get it. It's going to take 70 additional Marines to
expand the School of Infantry alone, for example. .. .Gray
needs more training dollars, but it's doubtful he'll get
them. At Lejeune's Infantry School, for instance, they say
they need another $2 million worth of ammunition. ... "Where
is the land for expanding field training? ... .Where are we
going to get the money?" (Jones, July 4, 1988, p. 16)
The difficult part of these initiatives is encountered in
the details of execution. Trainers must be trained, faculty
developed, facilities (publications, training simulators,
ranges, etc.) must be provided and the flow of students/
trainees through the system must be managed. All of this
takes time and money, both of which are in short supply in
the current environment. (Grace, 1989, p. 37)
E. SUMMARY
In this chapter we set the stage for the Marine Corps as
the Commandant assumed office and attempted to provide some
insight into views of the Marine Corps' posture at that time.
A model for the Marine Corps service planning process was
developed to explain the formal and informal processes which
shape the actions, thinking and planning efforts of Marines.
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The service planning process was described in the context of
the two interactive and interwoven phases—formulation and
implementation. Several initiatives, reflective of General
Gray's leadership style and interactions of the service
planning process were discussed. In the next chapter, we will
review the barriers to strategic management and develop
criteria to evaluate the service planning process for the
subsequent analysis.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MARINE CORPS SERVICE PLANNING PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
Evaluating or analyzing an organization's planning process
is an extremely complex undertaking. There are no accurate
gauges, precise correct answers, or infallible rules.
Additionally, what may seem or even prove to be a good formula
for success for one organization at a certain time and place,
may not hold true for another organization or for the same
organization at a different time and place. What works for
one organization may not prove to be a formidable concept or
implementable idea at another organization. Like the elements
that determine the weather (temperature, humidity, etc.),
numerous interacting factors (personalities, management
styles, organizational culture, etc.) affect the make-up of
an organization. And like the weather, where some like it
cold and others hot, the significance of each factor is
different for each organization. Each organization is a
melting pot filled with various personalities, cultures, and
environments, thereby making each organization and each
situation for that organization unique.
Despite these perplexities in analyzing effective
strategies, management styles, and planning systems, we can
develop guidelines and minimum critical criteria for effective
strategies to help us in our analysis of these processes.
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This chapter will establish criteria and guidelines for
analyzing the service planning process and then use those
criteria to analyze the Marine Corps service planning process.
We will begin this chapter by discussing the barriers of
effective strategic management, which will provide the
foundation for our criteria development and subsequent
analysis of the Marine Corps service planning process.
B. BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE STRATEGY
The road to building and maintaining a capable
organization and focusing resources and energies on strategic
accomplishment is filled with many impediments, obstructions
and barriers. These obstacles to strategic management
originate from both the external environment, as well as the
organization itself. The major external barriers to effective
strategic management, as identified by Peter Lorange in
Implementation of Strategic Planning , include: 1) scarcity of
resources; 2) politics; 3) social values and attitudes; 4)
power shifts; and 5) technology. While not an exhaustive
list, these five factors assuredly represent significant
issues of concern for effective strategic management. The
hurdles imposed by the external environment are compounded by
the internal barriers created by the organization itself.
While it may seem that the internal obstacles should be the
easiest to breech, they actually represent some of the
greatest challenges and implementation difficulties for
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management. This thought was echoed by Lorange when he said,
"Emerging internal constraints and handicaps created by the
organization itself may increasingly become barriers to
effective strategic management. It is indeed puzzling that
self-inflicted handicaps are frequently so dominate."
(Lorange, 1982, p. 220) Lorange went on further to identify
the internal barriers as: 1) inflexibility; 2) executive
obsolescence; 3) parochialism; 4) values, styles, and
traditions; and 5) power. These barriers can be capsulized
into four strategic management challenges put forth by John
Bryson in Strategic Planning for Public and Non-profit
Organizations . The four challenges consist of the human
problem, the process problem, the structure problem, and the
institutional problem. A brief overview of these four
challenges that make up the internal barriers will be provided
later in this section.
Both the external and internal barriers must be confronted
if the strategic management process is to assist in bringing
about changes in an organization. However, this section will
focus on the internal barriers and challenges, because the
external barriers, for the most part can be directly
correlated to the external factors (Congress, Executive
Branch, DoD, JCS, PPBS, etc.) influencing the service planning
process, which were discussed in earlier chapters.
Additionally, as noted above, it is the internal barriers
which pose the greatest management challenges. The four
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challenges to the strategic planning process expounded by
Bryson inundate the path to effective strategic management so
each challenge will be briefly addressed below.
The human problem includes the management of attention and
commitment of individuals, groups, and the organization as a
whole. While people are adaptive and may not recognize
gradual change, they also, generally speaking, are by nature,
creatures of habit and "change resistors." The reluctance by
people for change must be overcome. Stoner recognized this
when he said, "A major obstacle to the implementation of new
policies, goals, and methods of operation is the resistance of
organization members to change." (Stoner, Wankel, 1986, p.
358) Also, the overall organizational culture (the shared
understanding of norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs of an
organization) and effects of bureaucracies can impede
strategic change. Large organizations, such as the Marine
Corps, tend to be very structured and bureaucratic. Although
the Marine Corps may not be the archetypical machine
bureaucracy, as identified by Mintzberg in The Strategy
Process; Concepts. Contexts, and Cases , it certainly has many
of the characteristics of the machine bureaucracy and for many
reasons runs like a machine bureaucracy. And "as long as its
environment remains perfectly stable, the machine bureaucracy
faces no great difficulty of adaptation." (Mintzberg, 1988,
p. 556) But, a stable environment has certainly not been the
case for the Marine Corps.
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The second challenge of strategic management is the
process problem which entails the selling of "new ideas to
enough people that unconventional wisdom is turned into
conventional wisdom." (Bryson, 1989, p. 208) Effective
strategic management requires that organizations be good at
generating, as well as implementing ideas. The character-
istics, structure, values, and processes of an organization
can be enhancers or inhibitors in the development and
exploitation of new ideas. For the Marine Corps, the
Commandant plays a key role in establishing the make-up
(characteristics, structure, values, and processes) of the
organization. At the same time, it is the overall make-up of
the organization that provides the arena for the maneuver of
the top-level management and will greatly determine his
strategy making mode. Of the three strategy making modes
—
entrepreneurial, adaptive, and planning, as proposed by
Mintzberg, a large organization would tend to migrate towards
the slower reacting adaptive or planning mode. However, the
traditionally obedient, motivated, and well-disciplined Marine
Corps can offer the Commandant more opportunities, than other
large organizations, to operate in the more responsive and
action oriented entrepreneurial mode.
The third challenge of strategic management is the
structural problem, which encompasses the advantageous
linkages of internal and external environments across levels.
In other words, making the organization think and act as
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"one," and dealing with the "collective, rather than the
individual, nature of strategic planning." (Bryson, 1989, p.
211) While the Marine Corps is more homogeneous than the
other services, such as the Navy, who perhaps has more
divisive competition then the Corps, due the nature of their
specialty branches—surface, aviation, and submarine
specialties and the "barons" of those branches, nonetheless,
the facilitation of the "achievement of the collective
success" (Bryson, 1989, p. 213) is just as critical for the
Marine Corps as any other organization.
The final and most difficult challenge according to Bryson
is the institutional problem, which involves the transforma-
tion of institutions. "What we call institutions are in
essence highly stable patterns of interactions. .. organized
around important ideas." (Bryson, 1989, p. 214) These
patterns of interactions become institutions when they become
ingrained in the character of the organization. The
institutionalizing of ideas is the responsibility of the
leadership.
The four major categories of problems described above are
encountered throughout the strategic management process and
must be persistently addressed to obtain effective strategic
management. Albeit they only encompass the internal barriers,
these categories pose special areas of concern for management
which must be heavily considered. This is summed up by
Stoner's comment, "Strategy should, ideally, prevent such
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handicaps and free the organization from internal constraints,
at the very least, it must learn to cope with them." (Stoner,
1989, p. 249) In the next section, the four challenges to
effective strategic management will be used as a platform for
the development of the analysis criteria.
C. ANALYSIS CRITERIA
As previously indicated, there are no precision-calibrated
yardsticks for the mensuration of strategies. Yet, based on
historical examples and analyzes, there are certain critical
factors and structural elements which are needed for effective
strategies. In the book, The Stratecry Process; Concepts,
Contexts, and Cases , James Quinn lists seven critical items
required for effective strategy. These include: 1) clear,
decisive objectives; 2) maintaining the initiative; 3)
concentration; 4) flexibility; 5) coordinated and committed
leadership; 6) surprise; and 7) security. Additionally, Tom
Peters, in his book Thriving on Chaos
,
proposed criteria for
a good strategic planning process. Specifically he says:
A good strategic planning process (1) gets everyone
involved, (2) is not constrained by overall corporate
"assumptions" (e.g., about the general economics picture),
(3) is perpetually fresh, forcing the asking of new
questions, (4) is not to be left to the planners, and (5)
requires lots of noodling time and vigorous debate.
(Peters, 1987, pp. 615-616)
In an effort to focus our analysis and clearly define what we
are reviewing in order to determine if the Marine Corps
service planning process is strategic, we will use the
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questions listed below. The questions were aggregated from
the critical elements of strategy offered by James Quinn and
Tom Peter's criteria for a good strategic planning process,
using the four challenges of strategic management as the
foundation for the conj ointment.
- Human Problem: Does the service planning process enhance
commitment and overall involvement, obtain the attention
of key people to focus on key issues at key places in the
process, and provide the requisite motivational impact
necessary for change?
Process Problem: Does the service planning process
maintain the initiative and be flexible and adaptable
enough to allow for new questions, innovated ideas, and
vigorous debate?
- Structural Problem: Are all efforts directed towards
clearly understood, decisive and attainable overall
goals, and do the goals provide internal consistency,
compatibility with the environment, and appropriateness
in light of resources which will allow the organization
to act as a cohesive and coordinated unit?
Institutional Problem: Does the service planning process
provide for responsible and committed leadership who
furnish the "front-end" focus for the process to
institutionalize change?
While there may be an innumerable amount of questions one
could amass to analyze the Marine Corps service planning
process, the questions listed above will give us the ability
to focalize our analysis, yet provide us enough favor of the
process to make a judgment on its effectiveness.
D. ANALYSIS OF THE MARINE CORPS SERVICE PLANNING PROCESS
We will now turn our efforts to analyzing and evaluating
the Marine Corps service planning process by using the
criteria contained in the questions previously developed.
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Although the questions are overlapping and not completely
divorceable from one another, for the purpose of analysis, we
will view the strategic management of the Marine Corps from
the context of each question individually. After which, we
will conclude this section by taking a quick look at a few of
the impacts and outcomes of some of the changes recently
institutionalized by the Marine Corps, and what effects they
have had on how the Marine Corps sees itself and how the
external environment (Congress and the general public) view
the Marine Corps.
In terms of the human problem and its corresponding
criteria question, three words stand out—commitment,
involvement, and motivation. The Marine Corps has always been
a highly motivated and committed organization, so ideally the
service planning process would cultivate and provide the
steering mechanism of these attributes. One of the ways to
improve the motivation and commitment, in addition to steering
the overall efforts of an organization, is to involve people
in your ideas. This also capitalizes on all the talents of
the people in the organization. Additionally, commitment and
motivation are more apt to flourish when immersed in
involvement. Peters believes that a organization should
"involve all personnel at all levels in all functions in
virtually everything...." (Peters, 1987, p. 342)
From the description of the service planning process in
Chapter III, it is clear that General Gray has aggressively
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sought to involve all Marines—active, reserve and retired,
at all levels, as well as friends of Marines. To foster all
this involvement, the Commandant created an environment where
listening is endeared. General Gray not only pays close
attention to his staff and field commanders, but listens to
all ideas from wherever the source.
The degree of involvement by all concerned has increased
ten-fold, from the private, who suggests an innovated idea,
such as the idea to use thermal protective blankets to reduce
heat signatures, to the general who attends the general
officers symposium. Overall involvement in the service
planning process is also highly visible across all the
implementation modes— formal, interactive, and informal. The
structured formal planning process of the CBRS, not only
provides the active participation of the top-level management,
but infuses the active participation of all the key players at
the appropriate level in the development of planning documents
from the MGCP to the MLRP and MMP. Evidence of involvement is
also absolute in both the interactive and informal modes, for
General Gray could not have institutionalized so many
significant changes without the active involvement,
motivation, and commitment of the majority of the elements
(Marines and their friends) of the Marine Corps. The Marine
Corps service planning process under General Gray scores high
in reducing the challenge of the human problem of strategic
management. However, the human challenge is always
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reverberating and in the years ahead will continually
resurface, especially with the current tempo of change and
the almost certain continual dwindling of resources.
Sustaining the present momentum will be extremely difficult.
The next challenge facing strategic management is the
process problem. The service planning process should maintain
the initiative and have the flexibility to encourage,
recognize, and adapt to new opportunities and ideas. General
Gray ensures that the Marine Corps service planning process
maintains the initiative and his "get it done" attitude is
prevalent throughout the entire process. Peters makes the
statement, "Since our foremost need is to change more, faster,
we must induce a sense of urgency and hustle throughout the
organization." (Peters, 1987, p. 586) It is undeniable that
the Commandant has instilled a sense of urgency throughout the
Marine Corps. His dynamic, aggressive, and no-nonsense
leadership style demands it. During his first six months in
office, he has turned ideas, that have been debated for years,
into reality.
The verve for the service planning process to sustain the
initiative comes from the assertiveness of the Commandant and
the flexibility he provides in the process by empowering
people. The empowerment of people includes getting people





get it done." This is then reinforced by
reducing the inhibitors of action such as excessive layers of
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management and the bureaucratic bog. The flexibility the
Commandant gives the service planning process helps the Marine
Corps to respond to situations more rapidly and to make
adjustments to the continuing process of change.
This flexibility also enhances innovation. Innovation can
thrive more when organizations are flexible and adaptable.
But the Commandant does not just leave innovation up to the
flexibility of the service planning process alone. He places
much importance on innovation, and actively pursues and is in
constant search of new ideas and suggestions from all corners
of the Marine Corps. In General Gray's words, "Innovated
thought will stand above normal bureaucratic lobbies that
often interfere with clear vision." (Gray, 1988, p. 27) He
desires a "thinking" Marine Corps and encourages questions and
vigorous debate of the issues. The emphasis on innovation,
combined with a flexible and aggressive service planning
process, which can implement ideas and react relatively
quickly, has served well in negating the opposing effects of
the process problem of strategic management.
Although the advantages of an aggressive, flexible, and
innovated service planning process can certainly outweigh the
disadvantages, and so far it has for the Marine Corps, one
must also consider the future potential problems. For
instance, while flexibility and the move from specialization
is desireable, it also breeds inefficiencies, thereby
diminishing the main benefit of a bureaucracy, that of
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efficiency. Additionally, a highly aggressive and innovated
service planning process is not without its limitations and
risks. Innovation must be supported by resources—time and
funds. The high pay-offs of boldness and the Commandant's
desire to remain in the informal implementation mode are
layered with inherent risks and these risks can be compounded
by a "get it done" attitude unless tempered with judgment and
leadership.
The third challenge to strategic management is a
structural problem and deals with the goals of the
organization and their effect on the organization to act as a
cohesive unit. After the Beirut bombing, spy scandals, and
Oliver North's involvement in the Iranian Arms fiasco, many
were of the opinion that the Marine Corps needed a "shaking-
up." Upon confirmation as CMC, General Gray moved out smartly
to bring all the elements of the Marine Corps, from recruits
to retired, from private to general, back into a more cohesive
unit and focus the total efforts and resources of the Marine
Corps on the common goal of readiness and warfighting. The
Commandant has devoted a great amount of time and effort to
ensure all Marines understand his goals and "vision" for the
Marine Corps. While his goals expect a great deal from the
Marine Corps and not all his goals will be accomplished on his
watch, they are attainable and within the "sight-picture" of
the Marine Corps.
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To bring the Marine Corps in step, the Commandant created
an overall "sense of mission" for the Marine Corps through his
maneuver warfare and "back to the basics" philosophy. This
facilitated the many parts of the Marine Corps to pull
together as a "whole" instead of many little tugs from the
parts. The part-whole relations of an organization is summed
up in Bryson's statement,
The management of part whole relations can be made much
easier if the organization has a widely agreed-upon mission,
even easier if it has a widely agreed-upon vision of
success. Agreement on mission and vision will embed the
whole into the parts, maker the management of transition
easier, assure that a concern for the whole will limit
macro-nonsense, and will facilitate the achievement of the
collective success that effective strategic planning always
is. (Bryson, 1989, p. 213)
The "sense of mission" provided by the Commandant allowed the
Marine Corps to move forth as a more cohesive unit because it
reduced parochialism, careerism, and the "apparent trend
toward specialization and away from the general ists ideal of
every Marine a rifleman." (Grace, 1989, p. 30) It also
bonded more closely the vertical and horizontal divisions
within the Marine Corps. And communication and coordination
were improved across the "functional kingdoms." (Lorange,
1982, p. 221)
The Commandant has constructed a compelling "vision of
success" for the Marine Corps. His vision has been clear,
succinct, and well publicized, but more importantly it has
inspired the Marine Corps and widely shared by its members.
Many benefits have flowed from this, including a more cohesive
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organization that is in step and focuses on the "whole"
picture, a more committed, motivated, and involved
organization, and an induced "energy" about the system. This
can be seen from the Marine Corps general acceptance of the
Commandant's drive to stay in the informal mode of
implementation and a weaken of the bureaucratic machine to
pull it back into the formal mode, although the level of
resources may be the deciding factor in the end.
Finally, the fourth challenge of strategic management
which involves the institutional problem. This is a problem
of institutionalizing change. The book, Thriving on Chaos , is
devoted to change and Peters specially states, "To meet the
demands of the fast-changing competitive scene, we must simply
learn to love change as much as we have hated it." (Peters,
1987, p. 56) While not nearly to the degree or severity
attained during war, the every-day environment of the Marine
Corps is subjected to chaos, uncertainty, fluidity, and lack
of information. If the military trains for this type of
environment—war filled with chaos, uncertainty, and constant
change, one might expect that the military would be more at
ease with change. However, this does not seem to be the case.
In the introduction to Lind's book. Maneuver Warfare Handbook.
Colonel Studt, USMC (Ret) states,
. . .the entire movement for military reform is driven largely
by civilian intellectuals, not military officers. . . .When you
think about it, this is not surprising. We have never
institutionalized a system that encourages innovative ideas
or criticism from subordinates. Proposing significant
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change is frequently viewed as criticism of superiors, since
they are responsible for the way things are, and borders on
disloyalty if not insubordination. (Lind, 1985, pp. XI-XII)
To bring about reform. General Gray has sought to institution-
alize a system that encourages innovation and accepts
subordinate critique. Former Secretary of the Navy, Webb, has
said, "Al Gray is taking a leap that almost no other officer
inside the Pentagon has the guts to take. He's trying to get
his people to think differently." (Gold, 1989, p. 11).
General Gray's endeavor to institutionalize his changes
are ingrained in his warfighting philosophy of maneuver
warfare. A philosophy that encourages innovation, trust,
decentralization, and the focus of overall effort. With the
publication of FMFM 1, maneuver warfare was officially adopted
as Marine Corps doctrine. It described a way of thinking and
a philosophy of leadership. The philosophy behind maneuver
warfare is not intended only for the battlefield but is an
attitude and a way of life to be engrossed in all Marine Corps
actions and undertakings, in war and peace.
Thus far, we have analyzed the Marine Corps service
planning process using the criteria developed earlier. But an
analysis would not be complete without an evaluation of the
most important part and the purpose of the rest of the
strategy making model—the results and performance. In other
words, how has the service planning process affected the
Marine Corps? Unlike most businesses, the Marine Corps cannot
be evaluated on the amount of its profits or the number of
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wiggets produced. The evaluation is much more subjective and
judgmental. The Marine Corps is in the business of
warfighting
—
preparing for and, when necessary, conducting
war. To accomplish this, the Marine Corps must accomplish
three things. First and foremost, is to train and prepare for
war. Second, it must "sell" itself to the people and Congress
of the Country who provide the resources (manpower and
funding) and essence for existence. And thirdly, it must
"sell" itself to "itself."
In terms of preparing for war, the Marine Corps has made
giant strides. The thrust of all the Commandant's initiatives
have been directed towards the betterment of the Marine Corps
preparation for war. Much of his focus and some of his
highest priorities have been oriented on training and
education. He has undertaking an unprecedented effort to
ensure all Marines are prepared for war by "training the way
we will fight." (Gray, 1988, p. 26) And it is paying off,
from the recruit who receives the new Basic Warrior Training
at Boot Camp to the General who participates in General Gray's
wargaming exercises. In appearing before Congress to deliver
the Annual Report on the Marine Corps, General Gray said.
Our leaders will be trained to be self-reliant and capable
of independent decisions on the battlefield. Our overall
training will stress physical and mental toughness.
Wherever you see a Marine, there is one thing which you can
be certain; he'll be ready to fight, right there and then if
necessary. (Gray, 1988, p. 26)
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But has the Marine Corps really succeeded in achieving their
goal in preparing for war? Although there is always room for
improvement and the Corps will continue to strive for
improvement—Al Gray will see to that—it is generally
accepted that, by nearly all standards, today's Marine Corps
is the best in peace time history. "Today's Marine Corps,
most observers agree, is the best in peacetime history."
(Gold, 1989, p. 8) "A final and clear conclusion from the
events of 1988 is that the Marine Corps will continue to
represent a unique and irreplaceable force in U.S. national
security cababilities. "^ (Scharfen, 1989, p. 170) Overall, the
service planning process under General Gray has seemed to have
a positive effect on the warfighting preparations of the
Marine Corps.
As an off-shoot in the Marine Corps advances in its goal
to prepare "warriors" for war, the image of the Crops has
improved remarkably with both the Congress and the general
public. Prior to General Gray, the public and Congressional
opinion of the Marine Corps was low, as echoed in the
statements provided in the beginning of Chapter III. This
"downer" attitude held by the public and Congress has been
turned around by General Gray and now the Marine Corps is
viewed in an extremely positive light. The favorable
^Statement by Senator S. Nunn
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impressions are evident by the remarks of many of the
Congressman, such as those provided below:
I like what I see in the Corps under General Gray. It seems
to us on the Hill that he has focused on the right
priorities.^ (Scharfen, 1989, p. 168)
"He's extremely effective up here. He has surrounded
himself with people knowledgeable in Washington ways, in
particular people who know their way around Congress. ... I
think he (Gray) will be having a lot of difficultly getting
either additional manpower or money," Sen. John McCann, R-
Ariz. said of future budget requests from Congress. "But if
there is one service that will get more, it will be the
Marine Corps," he added, in reference to Congress' approval
of the way Gray is shaping the Corps. (Jones, 1988, p. 16)
The support of Congress has also been reflected in their
actions. Although the reinstatement of the V-22 Osprey back
into the budget is entangled in politics, it can also be
construed as Congress' support and approval in the direction
the Marine Corps is moving. Another example is the 1988 vote
by Congress for a unique multiyear procurement of the Marine's
AV-8B Harrier V/STOL attack aircraft. In the opinion of one
Pentagon official, "The Marines are well down the list of the
Navy aviation priorities. But Congress fortunately had the
foresight to stick the aircraft back in the budget. The AV-
8B is a Congressional aircraft." (Scharfen, 1989, p. 167)
The overall view of the Marine Corps, held by Congress, which
is reflective of the American people, is generally positive.
This positive attitude will render the Marine Corps many
benefits in the future, especially in the lean years ahead.
'statement by Representative Ben Blay
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Finally the Marine Corps must be concerned with its self-
image. How the elements of an organization view themselves is
important to the overall health of that organization. The
Marine Corps has always been an organization filled with
pride. Lately the pride has seemed to have been elevated.
This is evidenced throughout the Marine Corps by comments such
as:
"The troops are eager for [Gray's Message] ... .They believe
in being warriors and they want to get back to the basics."*
(Jones, 1988, p. 16)
Today, two years after Webb's decision and midway through
Gray's tenure as Commandant, the Corps manifests a peacetime
intensity unknown since the pre-World War II era. The
enthusiasm is ubiquitous. "I'm having fun," says Brig. Gen.
William P. Eshelman, commanding the 5th Marine Expeditionary
Brigade at Camp Pendleton, Calif. Says Lt. Col. Bob Cohen,
a battalion commander at Twentynine Palms, Calif.,
"Everybody has their hot buttons. The Marine Corps is
mine." Pvt Voiselle Higgins Jr., a few weeks out of boot
camp, agrees. I wanted to serve with the best. I am."
(Gold, 1989, p. 9)
E. SUMMARY
In this chapter we discussed the barriers to strategic
management and the service planning process, developed
analytical criteria, and finally analyzed and evaluated the
Marine Corps process. From our analysis of the Marine Corps
service planning process we have determined that the process
meets the criteria for being strategic and effectively
addresses each of the four challenges of strategic management.
An analysis of the criteria and challenges of strategic
"statement by Sgt Maj Peter Jenison.
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management provides us an indication of how the system is
doing and its susceptibility to failure. The indications for
the Marine Corps point in a favorable direction, towards a
more strategic and effective process.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
A. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of our study was to examine, describe, and
analyze the Marine Corps Service Planning Process, determine
the extent that it is strategic and effective. From our
review of the service planning process and subsequent analysis
and evaluation, we believe it to be both very strategic and
extremely effective.
The "downers" caused by the Beirut Bombing, Moscow
Security Guard Spy Scandal and the Oliver North arms deal
fiasco created an opportunity for change. The appointment of
General Gray and his emphasis on warfighting sparked and
energized the organization to change. His "back to the
basics" appeal in implementing a "maneuver warfare" doctrine
won the support and acceptance from not only all elements of
the Marine Corps, but the Congress and the general public as
well. The Commandant provided the sense of mission for the
Marine Corps to move forward as a committed, integrated and
cohesive unit. The end result is a Marine Corps better
prepared for war and an organization with an improved image
and restored reputation.
The process is an effective hybrid of entrepreneurial
innovation, vitality, and bureaucratic efficiency and
thoroughness. The Commandant has effectively provided
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guidance and strategic direction and devoted the time and
energy to ensure everyone understood his vision. He has
actively sought involvement and ideas from his organization
from both inside and outside the normal bureaucratic channels.
These ideas were validated with the system and then
expeditiously put into practice using a formal, informal or
interactive approach as necessary. This blend of guidance and
direction from the top, mixed with new and innovative ideas
from the bottom has created a very coherent, integrated
organization that is also flexible and adaptive to the chaotic
environment in which it operates.
The Commandant is institutionalizing his warfighting
philosophy of "maneuver warfare." A maneuver warfare
philosophy in preparing combat forces can make for a more
effective organization. A well-disseminated and publicized
commander's intent (a vision), mission type orders,
decentralized control, opportunistic seizure of innovative
ideas, coupled with the swift, practical application of them
are the keys to his vision of success not only on the
battlefield, but in the organizational swordsmithing process
as well.
Overall, we have given high marks to General Gray and the
Marine Corps service planning process, but there are other
very important considerations that must be mentioned. First
and foremost, we must consider the Marine Corps organization
itself. The Marine Corps is a unique organization that has
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distinguished itself, in war and peace, throughout its
history. The Marine Corps commitment, motivation, and esprit
de corps has always been unsurpassed, even during the dark
times. Although General Gray has been inspiring, it is
doubtful that he could have accomplished so much with any
other public organization equivalent in size. The second
consideration is the point-in-time in which we are analyzing
and evaluating the Marine Corps service planning process. The
Marine Corps is only mid-way through the Commandant's tenure.
At the start of his term, the Marine Corps came "out of the
blocks" at a sprinter's pace and has kept that pace ever
since, but the Marine Corps is not running a short race. It
is an endurance race with many sharp turns and bends ahead.
Within this context, are we making judgments at the beginning
of a marathon? Can the momentum be sustained? Is the Marine
Corps running so fast it won't be able to negotiate all the
bends in the narrow road ahead? Thirdly, success today does
not guarantee success tomorrow. Just meeting our criteria for
being strategic does not guarantee success and there is
"nothing inherent in a strategic planning system that
guarantees that the 'right' strategy will be chosen."
(Lorange, 1982, p. 37) And finally, General Gray and the
service planning process we are evaluating, are the
benefactors of the "greatest modernization of the Marine Corps
that we ever experienced" (Scharfen, 1988, p. 162) which was
orchestrated by former Commandant, General P.X. Kelly.
122
In summary, while we view the Marine Corps service
planning process very strategic and extremely effective, the
successes of today are not guaranteed to be carried over into
the future. The Marine Corps will face many new challenges in
the future—both internal and external—and these will be
compounded by the persistent and recurring nature of the
problems and challenges of strategic management. However, we
fully anticipate history will look back favorably upon General
Gray and support the idea that he was the "right man at the
right time."
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The exploration of new organizational techniques that can
bring critical issues and innovative ideas quickly into
the strategic management process.
- The study of structural factors necessary to move the
Marine Corps to the maneuver warfare philosophy and
doctrine, and an analysis of the barriers that make such
movement difficult.
The study of the impact of forcasted budget reductions on
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